People v. Bowman

Foote, C. The defendant was tried and convicted, upon an information, of murder in the first degree in [567]the killing of one Samuel Dunn. From the judgment therein rendered, and an order refusing a new trial, he has appealed.

One of the grounds upon which he bases his contention that a new trial should be awarded him is, that the evidence does not show that he committed the murder with which he is charged; and conceding that any killing is shown to have been done by him, it does not appear that murder in the first degree was committed.

It is undoubtedly the law, as he claims, that, in order to convict of murder in the first degree, the defendant must be shown by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to have killed the person with whose murder he is charged, with the deliberate, premeditated, and malicious intent so to do. (People v. Cox, 76 Cal. 282, 286; Pen. Code, sec. 189.) But it is the province of the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances in evidence whether the killing is accompanied by all the ingredients which go to make up the crime charged. In this case a very strenuous argument is made upon all the evidence which was adduced, both direct and circumstantial, that the defendant is not proved to have been guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt, and that the jury have found him guilty by inferring material facts not in evidence from facts in evidence which only amount to inferences. When counsel proceed by argument to elaborate their views on the matter, they seem to advance no further than to the point that the circumstantial evidence in the case is insufficient to show the identity of the body found with that of the deceased; that the defendant killed him, and that he did it maliciously, with premeditation and deliberation. There are many facts and circumstances appearing in the record before us which tend strongly to show that the defendant and none other was the slayer of Dunn; that the purpose of the killing was plunder, to obtain possession of the property which Dunn had and the defendant lacked; that the [568]murder was accomplished by, first, a shot in the head, and then by the crushing of the disabled man’s skull with a rock; that the murderer then left the body of his mutilated and whilom trusting friend to be the prey of wild beasts. There was proof that the defendant took Dunn’s watch and other property, and endeavored to prevent inquiry by asking a witness not to tell that he had a companion or partner on the Summit. The body of Dunn was found decomposed in a secluded place, with the skull in the condition above mentioned, and the hat identified as being his lying near with a bullet hole in it. These things and many other matters which were disclosed by the evidence were duly weighed by the jury, under the instructions of the court, and we cannot say their conclusions were manifestly wrong. They must have given each fact or circumstance, whether for or against the defendant, proper consideration; and this is not a case where we can declare that the evidence is such that the jury should have acquitted, or only found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. They saw and heard the witnesses, and were in possession of all that was said orally by them, whether the statement of a fact or circumstance, they looked upon the mute evidence in the case,— the shoes with peculiar pegs, the handkerchief, the watch, the gun, the hat, the pieces of skull, and the rock. They have declared by their verdict that they believe, from all the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. We do not feel called upon to say their verdict is unwarranted.