California Court of Appeal Jun 30, 2022 No. E078259Unpublished
Filed 6/30/22 In re A.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL E078259 SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ2000657) Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v.
C.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michele A. Mathis,
Judge. Affirmed.
Joanne D. Willis Newton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, C.M.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, B.H.
1
Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendants and appellants
B.H. (mother) and C.M. (father) as to their son, A.M. (the child). Mother and father
filed separate briefs, and both contend the court erred by finding the beneficial parental
relationship exception to termination of parental rights inapplicable. (Welf. & Inst.
possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) A permanent plan of adoption necessarily
involves termination of the biological parents’ parental rights to the child. (Id. at p.
574.)
In selecting a permanent plan for the child, the court is first required to
determine whether the child is likely to be adopted. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If
the court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the child is likely to be
3 We note that mother and father refer to the “prospective adoptive parents” (plural) in their arguments. When describing the child’s placement, the court did state, “That home and those parents are the parents that the child knows best at this time.” However, in her reports, the social worker only referred to a singular prospective adoptive parent. Therefore, we will refer to the prospective adoptive parent in the singular form. 10
adopted, and if there has been a previous court determination, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it would be detrimental to the child to return the child to his or her
parent or guardian (§§ 366.21, 366.22), then the court is required to terminate parental
rights and select adoption as the child’s permanent plan, unless the parent shows that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under at least one of
several statutory exceptions to the adoption preference. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court
exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose
an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 45, 53.) The parental-benefit exception applies where the court finds a
“compelling reason” for determining that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child because, in the words of the statute, “[t]he parents have
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Our Supreme Court recently clarified the proper application of the parental-
benefit exception and, in doing so, discerned “three elements the parent must prove to
establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631
(Caden C.).) As Caden C. indicates, the second and third elements of the exception
are inextricably connected.
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The Autumn H. court recognized this connection when it interpreted “the
‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the
relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the
well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In
other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child
relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a
new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would
deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child
would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural
parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Autumn H., 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, italics
added.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings on the first two elements of the
parental-benefit exception for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 639-640.) “The determination that the parent has visited and maintained contact
with the child . . . is essentially a factual determination. It’s likewise essentially a
factual determination whether the relationship is such that the child would benefit from
continuing it.” (Ibid.) The third element—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child—is “somewhat different” in that it requires the court
to “assess[] what the child’s life would be like in an adoptive home without the parent
in his life.” (Id. at p. 640.) “The court makes the assessment by weighing the harm [to
the child] of losing the relationship against the benefits [to the child] of placement in a
new, adoptive home. And so, the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental
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rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with [the]
parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
A court abuses its discretion only when it “ ‘ “has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ”
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) A reviewing court should find an
abuse of discretion, “only ‘ “if ” ’ ” it finds that no judge could reasonably have made
the decision that the judge did, when all of the evidence is viewed most favorably in
support of the judge’s decision. (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)
B. The Court Apparently Found That Both Mother and Father Maintained
Regular Visitation and Each Had a Relationship That Would Benefit the Child
As to the first element of the beneficial parental relationship exception, the
record shows the parents did not visit the child consistently at the beginning of the
dependency. However, at the section 366.26 hearing, the court found that the
visitation had been consistent and appropriate. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 631.) Respondent acknowledges the court’s finding.
As to the second element, mother asserts that the child benefitted from time
with her, since she was attentive to his needs and affectionate toward him, and she was
“appropriate and there were no concerns.” Mother points out that she played with him
on the floor, fed him, changed his diapers, read books with him, and played music to
calm him. She asserts that he “appeared to recognize [her], as well.” Father simply
asserts the court correctly found that the parents satisfied the second element. The
court stated, “I do believe that there are benefits to be had for maintaining a
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relationship with the parents, . . .” Respondent does not appear to dispute that the
court found the child had a relationship with the parents, the continuation of which
would benefit the child. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
C. Mother and Father Failed to Establish That Termination of Parental Rights
Would Be Detrimental to the Child
Assuming the first two elements were met, the parents have still failed to
establish that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.
“Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination would be detrimental to the
child due to’ the relationship—the court must decide whether it would be harmful to
the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 633.) The court “decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs
‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.; see
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
Mother asserts the evidence showed the visits were appropriate, and she was
attentive to his needs. She states that she “was someone he recognized in his life” and
simply concludes that “[t]his very young child will be harmed by eliminating Mother
from his life.” Father proffers no evidence regarding this third element, but instead
argues that the court erred when it considered the effects of uprooting the child from
the prospective adoptive parent, as well as the postadoption contact agreement. (See
post, § D.)
Mother’s and father’s interactions with the child do not even begin to
demonstrate that their relationship with him promoted his well-being “to such a degree
14
as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new,
adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Neither parent has
proffered any evidence to support a finding that the child had a “substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed” if the relationship
was severed. (Ibid.) For this reason alone, the parental benefit exception is clearly
inapplicable. While the evidence showed the parents visited regularly, were attentive
to his needs, played with the child, and enjoyed the visits, the social worker described
the child’s response to the parents as being that he “appears to recognize them.” At
best, mother’s and father’s supervised interactions with the child “amounted to little
more than playdates for him with . . . loving adult[s].” (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 1308, 1316.) Furthermore, their visits did not necessarily promote the
child’s well-being, but were actually detrimental at times. The evidence showed the
child experienced distressing emotions following visits with the parents. The
prospective adoptive mother reported that the child’s demeanor would completely
change as he entered the room for the visits at the DPSS office, as if he knew what was
going to occur. Then after the visits, he would struggle with crying, or his sleep would
be affected.
In contrast, the evidence showed the child was bonded with the prospective
adoptive mother. The social worker stated that he “clearly leans towards the
prospective adoptive mother as his primary attachment figure,” and observed that “it is
clear by [the child’s] demeanor that he is bonded and attached to his prospective
adoptive mother and to the extended family.” As the court noted, the child was
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approximately two months old when he was placed in the prospective adoptive home,
and by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, he had lived there for over one year.
The prospective adoptive mother provided excellent care and a warm, consistent, and
calm environment for the child. She was committed to adopting him and to meeting
all his needs.
Ultimately, mother and father failed to meet their burden of showing that the
child had a substantial, emotional attachment to them such that terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to him when balanced against the benefit of an
adoptive home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Therefore, the court properly
declined to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
D. The Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error
Mother claims the court improperly focused on whether she “acted as a parent”
compared to the prospective adoptive mother, whom the child viewed more as his
parent. Father similarly argues that the court improperly considered the effects of
uprooting the child from the prospective adoptive mother. He asserts that the court
should have focused on the impact on the child of the loss of the parent-child
relationship, rather than the impact on him of the loss of the relationship with the
prospective adoptive mother.
In support of her argument, mother cites In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
197 (L.A.-O.), in which the trial court found the parental-benefit exception did not
apply, partly because the parents “ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a long time” and
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partly because the prospective adoptive parents “ha[d] been acting in a parental role.”
This court noted that Caden C. did not use the words “parental role,” and because the
trial court used the terminology “parental role,” we could not tell whether its ruling
conformed with Caden C. Thus, we remanded the matter for reconsideration of the
parental-benefit exception. (L.A.-O., at p. 202.)
Here, the court’s statements should be read in context. After acknowledging
the parents had visited the child consistently and appropriately, the court stated: “I’d
countervailingly also note that the child has been placed in its current placement for
over a year at this time, since the child was approximately two and a half months old.
That home and those parents are the parents that the child knows best at this time, and
there is a substantial benefit to the minor in not uprooting its life as well. . . . [¶] So
while I do believe that there are benefits to be had for maintaining a relationship with
the parents, I do not believe that those benefits outweigh the benefit of permanency for
such a young child who is not at this time even two years old.” Contrary to mother’s
claim, the court did not focus on whether she was “acted as a parent” compared to the
caretakers, and it did not use the words “parental role,” as in L.A.-O. Rather, the court
properly assessed the parents’ visitation and their relationship with the child and
considered whether any harm would come from losing that relationship. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) It further properly considered “how a prospective
adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those harms.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, contrary to father’s claim that the court erred in considering the effects of
uprooting the child from the caregiver, the court properly considered whether “the
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relationship [with him and mother] promote[d] the well-being of the child to such a
degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with
new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, italics added.)
Although the court did note that the child was thriving with the prospective adoptive
parent, the court’s analysis focused on balancing the termination of the parental
relationship against the benefits of permanency the child would gain in an adoptive
home. This was not error.
Mother also claims that the trial court committed reversible error in relying on
“a potential unenforceable [postadoption] contract with the caretakers to allow
ongoing contact.” Father joins in this argument. However, the court did not base its
decision to terminate parental rights on the prospective adoptive parent’s willingness
to allow visitation post adoption. (See S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.)
Rather, the court first found that the beneficial parental exception did not apply, and
then it ordered the Department to “make inquiries with the prospective adoptive
parent[] regarding a postadoption contract and ongoing contact” between the parents
and the child. Thus, there was no reversible error.
To the extent mother and father join in each other’s briefs, we also affirm the
court’s judgment. Accordingly, we need not address their argument that if each
other’s parental rights are reinstated, theirs should be as well.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
19
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception inapplicable, as the parents failed to demonstrate that their relationship with the child was so significant that its termination would outweigh the benefits of permanency in an adoptive home.
Issues
Did the juvenile court err in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception inapplicable under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)?
Did the court improperly consider the child's relationship with the prospective adoptive parent or the potential for postadoption contact when evaluating the exception?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.”
“mother and father failed to meet their burden of showing that the child had a substantial, emotional attachment to them such that terminating the relationship would be detrimental to him when balanced against the benefit of an adoptive home.”