A.W. v. S.W. CA3

Filed 6/28/22 A.W. v. S.W. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Placer) ----

A.W.,

Plaintiff and Respondent, C089788

v. (Super. Ct. No. S-DR- 0037210) S.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

A.C., formerly A.W., applied for and received a renewed and permanent domestic violence restraining order against her former spouse S.W. under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a).1 S.W. now contends (1) the trial court misunderstood and misapplied the standard for determining whether A.C.’s fear of S.W. was reasonable, (2) the domestic violence restraining order is not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by making the renewed domestic violence restraining order permanent. Finding no merit in S.W.’s contentions, we will affirm the trial court’s order.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

1

BACKGROUND A Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, a court may restrain a person to prevent a recurrence of domestic violence upon reasonable proof of past acts of abuse. (§ 6300.) Section 6345 addresses the duration and renewal of a domestic violence restraining order. When initially issued, the order “may have a duration of not more than five years” and is subject to termination or modification by order of the court based on the parties’ stipulation or a motion of a party. (§ 6345, subd. (a).) The domestic violence restraining order “may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party.” (§ Id., subd. (a).) “When contested, a request to renew a restraining order should not be granted pursuant to section 6345 simply because the requesting party has ‘a subjective fear the party to be restrained will commit abusive acts in the future.’ (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288 (Ritchie).) ‘The “apprehension” those acts will occur must be “reasonable.” ’ (Ibid.) ‘That is, the court must find the probability of future abuse is sufficient that a reasonable woman (or man, if the protected party is a male) in the same circumstances would have a “reasonable apprehension” such abuse will occur unless the court issues a protective order.’ (Ibid.) “An imminent and present danger of abuse is not required, however. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.) ‘In other words, under this objective test, “[a] trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse. . . . [T]his does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected