Haghighi v. Mercury Casualty Co. CA4/2 (2022) · DecisionDepot
Haghighi v. Mercury Casualty Co. CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jun 23, 2022 No. E074669Unpublished
Filed 6/23/22 Haghighi v. Mercury Casualty Co. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
AHMAD HAGHIGHI,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E074669
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1803392)
MERCURY CASUALTY COMPANY, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian S.
McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Kaveh Keshmiri and Kaveh Keshmiri for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wesierski & Zurek, Christopher P. Wesierski, Laura J. Barns, and Mary H. Kim,
for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Ahmad Haghighi owns and manages an apartment building.
He filed a claim with his insurance company, defendant and respondent Mercury
Casualty Company (Mercury), contending that the property had been vandalized.
Haghighi and Mercury disagreed about the appropriate amount to be paid on the claim,
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and Haghighi brought suit. The trial court granted nonsuit in favor of Mercury on two of
Haghighi’s three causes of action (the second and third causes of action asserted in his
and “covenant of good faith and fair dealing” as interchangeable].)
A prerequisite for establishing a violation of that primary right (however framed)
is proof that the defendant insurer breached the insurance contract. “[T]here are at least
two separate requirements to establish breach of the implied covenant: (1) benefits due
under the policy must have been withheld; and (2) the reason for withholding benefits
must have been unreasonable or without proper cause.” (Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1151; see also Brodkin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
(1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 210, 218 [“there could be no cause of action for breach of the
covenant of good faith or of any statutory duty” if the insurer properly denied the claim
under the policy]; California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1986)
184 Cal.App.3d 1428, 1433 [no award for bad faith can be made “without first
establishing that coverage exists”]; Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co., supra, 196
Cal.App.4th at p. 1470 [“as [plaintiff] has no viable breach of contract claim against [the
insurer] . . . , his claim for bad faith denial of insurance benefits fails as a matter of
law”].) As our Supreme Court has explained, “the covenant is implied as a supplement to
the express contractual covenants [....] Absent that contractual right, however, the
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implied covenant has nothing upon which to act as a supplement, and ‘should not be
endowed with an existence independent of its contractual underpinnings.’” (Waller v.
Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 36.)
Applying these principles here, Haghighi cannot make the necessary showing that
the judgment would have been any different had the trial court ruled differently on
Mercury’s motion for nonsuit. The jury decided in favor of Mercury on Haghighi’s
breach of contract claim. That finding, unchallenged on appeal, is fatal to his contention
that Mercury acted in bad faith, no matter whether framed as a tort claim or contract
claim. If Haghighi’s second and third causes of action had also been allowed to go to the
jury, the result necessarily would have been the same; judgment in favor of the defense.
Similarly, the preclusive effect of the jury’s verdict on the contract claim would make
any remand futile, since Haghighi could not prevail in any retrial of the bad faith issue.
(See People v. Seldomridge (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 362, 365 [we will not reverse for
further proceedings when to do so would be “a useless and futile act and would be of no
benefit to appellant”]; see also Lindeleaf v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1986) 41
Cal.3d 861, 876 [refusing to remand for futile act]; Charles H. Duell, Inc. v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Corp. (1932) 128 Cal.App 376, 385 [“it remains a rule of appellate
procedure that a reviewing court will not remand a case where further proceedings
therein would be futile”].)
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Thus, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in granting nonsuit in favor
of Mercury on Haghighi’s second and third causes of action. Reversal would be
inappropriate, even assuming error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Mercury is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED FOR OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the judgment because the jury's unchallenged defense verdict on the breach of contract claim precluded the plaintiff from prevailing on his bad faith claims, rendering any potential error in granting nonsuit harmless.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in granting nonsuit on the plaintiff's bad faith and implied covenant causes of action.
Whether the jury's verdict on the breach of contract claim renders any error in the nonsuit ruling harmless.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Haghighi failed to demonstrate prejudice, even if the nonsuit grant was erroneous, because the jury’s defense verdict on the first cause of action necessarily precludes a verdict in Haghighi’s favor on the other two.”
“as [plaintiff] has no viable breach of contract claim against [the insurer] . . . , his claim for bad faith denial of insurance benefits fails as a matter of law”