California Court of Appeal May 26, 2022 No. E077726Unpublished
Filed 5/26/22 P. v. Eynon CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E077726
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI21001104)
DAVID SCOTT EYNON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Miriam Ivy
Morton, Judge. Reversed.
David G. Steward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and
Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant David Scott Eynon pled no
contest to one count of receiving a stolen vehicle. (Pen. Code,1 § 496d). The trial court
ordered him to pay victim restitution for the difference between the replacement cost of
The probation department submitted a victim restitution memo for $7,664.39,
calculated as follows: $2,888.96 for the truck; $3,730.30 for the trailer; and $1,045.13
for the personal property that was inside the truck. The out-of-pocket costs for the truck
were further broken down as follows: $22,000 for the replacement truck, plus $250 for
the insurance deductible, minus the $19,361.04 paid to the owner by his insurance
company for the stolen truck.3 Defense counsel filed points and authorities on restitution
opposing the prosecution’s restitution request. He pointed out that the truck was stolen in
December 2020, and defendant was found in possession of the truck on April 14, 2021;
furthermore, the owner was paid for the truck by his insurance company on or around
January 11, 2021, and it was safe to assume he replaced his truck before April 14, 2021;
thus, it was speculative to argue that defendant’s possession of the truck caused the out-
of-pocket expenses for the replacement of the truck.
The court held a restitution hearing on September 13, 2021. It first noted that the
complaint only charged defendant with receiving the stolen truck, not the trailer. The
prosecutor conceded but argued that the police report was the factual basis for the plea,
and the court had “discretion in determining the value of lost or damaged property,”
which “could be related to a truck towing a trailer if the trailer is not specifically noted,
let’s say, in the complaint, . . .” The court asked about the defense argument that
3 The memo, as submitted, incorrectly calculated the truck’s total out-of-pocket costs as $3,730.30. However, the court noticed the error and changed it to the correct amount of $2,888.96. 6
defendant was being held responsible “for personal property from a vehicle that was
stolen, and he was charged with receiving stolen property and [there was] no indication
that he had the vehicle until the later date.” The prosecutor explained that they could
have charged defendant with both taking/driving the vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) and
receiving stolen property, but if he was convicted of both, there would have been an
argument for Penal Code section 654. He then stated, “it [was] the same transaction that
occurred.” The court then asked if there was any information that defendant stole the
truck or was in possession of the truck the month before. The prosecutor checked the
record and responded, “So there’s no evidence in the report as to that, but there is
evidence that the trailer was being towed during the traffic stop, your Honor.” The court
asked if the owner got his truck and trailer back, and the prosecutor said, “No. The
insurance had to pay him out for the loss.”
Defense counsel argued defendant pled to one count of receiving a stolen vehicle
on a particular date and was not charged with or responsible for the trailer or the owner’s
personal property. Defense counsel further asserted that the owner was paid his expenses
on or before January 11, 2021, which was long before defendant was in possession of the
truck. He added that “the point of restitution is to make the victim whole, but make the
victim whole based on the acts for which [defendant] is charged, convicted, or otherwise
responsible for. And I don’t think that’s this case.”
The prosecutor responded by noting that defendant said he got the truck from a
female and added, “So technically if, let’s say, we had both defendants on the case, and
[defendant] is pointing his finger hypothetically at that lady, saying, She took it. She is
7
good for the 10851. I am there. I get it after. I am good for a 496. [¶] Technically, your
Honor, we have joint and several liability. And let’s say this defendant pleads out, and he
is basically ordered by the Court to pay in full all restitution to the victim. He can
thereafter technically, since they are joint and severally liable in a criminal case, your
Honor two defendants committing something—then he can basically say the other person
is good for the other part of it.”
After hearing arguments, the court corrected the out-of-pocket costs for the truck
from $3730.30 to $2,888.96, and then simply stated it was going to order restitution in
the amount of $2,888.96 for the truck.
C. The Owner’s Economic Losses Were Not a Result of Defendant’s Conduct or
Crime
In Woods, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 1045, a defendant was charged with being an
accessory after the fact of a murder (§ 32), based on the allegation that immediately
following the murder, the defendant received the weapon used by the shooter. (Id. at
p. 1048.) A jury found him guilty. (Ibid.) At the restitution hearing, defense counsel
argued there was no nexus between the defendant’s criminal act and the losses incurred
by the victim’s family. In particular, he noted that the defendant had not been convicted
as a coconspirator or as an aider and abettor to the murder. The trial court ordered the
defendant to pay a total of $12,082.23 to the victim compensation fund, which
represented the amount paid by the fund to the victim’s surviving relatives. (Id. at
pp. 1048-1049.)
8
The defendant appealed, claiming that he could not lawfully be ordered to pay
victim restitution for economic losses stemming from the murder because he was not
convicted of murder, but only of being an accessory after the fact. (Woods, supra, 161
Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.) The court cited section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1), as providing
that “a ‘victim of crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a
crime shall receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime.’ ”
(Woods, at p. 1049.) The court observed that “[c]ourts have interpreted section 1202.4 as
limiting restitution awards to those losses arising out of the criminal activity that formed
the basis of the conviction.” (Ibid.) It then cited section 1202.4, subdivision (f), which
provides that “ ‘ “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result
of the defendant’s criminal conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make
restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the
amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
The Woods court further cited the portion of People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
1227 (Lai) which states, “ ‘Construed in light of [section 1202.4] subdivision (a)(1) and
(3)(B), the term “criminal conduct” as used in subdivision (f) means the criminal conduct
for which the defendant has been convicted.’ ” (Woods, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1049; see Lai, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247.) In other words, “the reimbursable
loss identified by section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1) is the loss resulting from the crime of
which the defendant was convicted.” (Lai, at p. 1247.)
9
The Attorney General in Woods argued that a conviction for being an accessory
after the fact “ ‘has sufficient nexus to the victim’s economic loss so as to render that loss
“a result of the defendant’s conduct . . .” under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision
(f).’ ” (Woods, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) However, the Woods court
disagreed, observing that “a charge of being an accessory after the fact is ‘based on
conduct taking place only after the loss was sustained.’ ” (Ibid.) The court then agreed
with Lai that “section 1202.4 limits the scope of victim restitution to the operative crime
that resulted in the loss.” (Ibid., citing Lai, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.) The
Woods court stated that the loss to the victim’s family occurred because of the murder
committed by the shooter. It concluded that “[the d]efendant was not convicted as a
coconspirator or as an aider or abettor to the murder itself. Thus his criminal conduct did
not cause the loss for which compensation was sought.” (Woods, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1052, fn. omitted.)
In the instant case, defendant’s conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle was based
on him receiving the truck on April 14, 2021. As defendant points out, the owner’s
economic losses were a result of the theft of his truck, which occurred in December 2020.
Furthermore, defendant was not convicted as a coconspirator or as an aider or abettor of
the theft. Thus, his criminal conduct of receiving the stolen truck a few months after the
theft did not cause the owner’s loss for which compensation was sought. (See Woods,
supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) As discussed ante, the court in Woods determined
that the defendant’s crime of being an accessory after the fact was “ ‘based on conduct
taking place only after the loss was sustained,’ ” and the court reversed the order
10
requiring the defendant to pay $12,082.23 in restitution to the murder victim’s family.
(Id. at pp. 1052, 1054.) Similarly, here, defendant’s crime of receiving a stolen vehicle
on April 14, 2021, was based on conduct that took place after the owner’s loss of the
truck was sustained. Defendant cannot be assessed restitution for economic losses that
did not result from the crime of which he was convicted. (Lai, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1246 [“section 1202.4 limits restitution to losses caused by the criminal conduct for
which the defendant was convicted”].) Importantly, there is no evidence here that
defendant possessed the vehicle prior to the date he was detained with the vehicle, which
was several months after the theft.
Relying on People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310 (Holmberg), the
People argue that, even though defendant was not charged with or convicted of vehicle
theft, his role in accepting possession of the stolen truck was a concurrent cause of the
owner’s economic losses. In Holmberg, the defendant, who had been convicted of
concealing stolen property (computer equipment), asserted that a restitution award based
on loss of use of the property was improper since those damages were due to the burglary
and would have occurred regardless of his conduct. (Id. at pp. 1313, 1318.) The court of
appeal rejected his claim, observing that there was ample evidence of a causal connection
between the victims’ losses and his conduct. (Id. at p. 1323.) The court noted that
nothing prevented the defendant from turning over the stolen equipment to the police, and
it concluded that the defendant’s “concealing of the stolen property was a concurrent
cause in depriving the victims of the use of their property.” (Id. at p. 1322.) The court
found it “significant that [the] defendant obtained the property the day it was stolen,” and
11
stated that, “[h]ad he contacted law enforcement about the items when he received them,
[the victims] would not have had to replace them or incur a one-week loss of business
and productivity.” (Ibid., italics added.) The court thus concluded that the defendant’s
conduct “played far more than a negligible or theoretical part in bringing about the
victims’ injuries and was a substantial factor in causing the harm they suffered.” (Ibid.)
The court reiterated that “by holding on to the equipment, knowing it was stolen, [the]
defendant’s conduct was a concurrent cause of the victims’ losses and a substantial factor
in causing their damages.” (Id. at pp. 1323-1324.)
Here, the People argue that, like Holmberg, defendant’s conduct of possessing the
stolen truck “was a legitimate concurrent cause of, and a substantial factor in, the victim’s
economic loss.” The People cite defendant’s explanation that he received the truck from
a “sketchy” female and was on his way to return it to the owner, and claim that, even
assuming defendant had no part in the original theft, he “undoubtedly assisted the original
thief or thieves by providing them with a ready means of disposing . . . the stolen loot so
that they themselves would not be caught in possession of it.” The People conclude that,
based on the circumstances of his questionable story, the trial court “could have
reasonably found that [defendant] was at least substantially involved in the chain of
criminal activity that resulted in the victim’s economic loss.”
Holmberg is distinguishable from the instant case. In that case, the court stressed
that the defendant was found in possession of the stolen equipment “on the very day the
burglary occurred.” (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323.) The court thus held
that the defendant concealed the equipment from the victims, deprived them of the use of
12
their property, and caused or contributed to them having to replace it. (Id. at p. 1322.)
Here, in contrast, defendant was found in possession of the stolen truck about four
months after it was stolen. Unlike the defendant in Holmberg, he did not deprive the
owner of the use of his truck from the day it was stolen. Moreover, by the time defendant
was found in possession of the truck, the insurance company had paid off the owner for
the stolen truck and he, in turn, released the title to the truck. In other words, he no
longer owned the truck, and defendant’s conduct of being in possession of the truck did
not affect him or contribute to his economic losses. Accordingly, the restitution award
was improper since the owner’s losses were due to the theft of the truck and occurred
regardless of defendant’s conduct. We further note that there is nothing in the record to
support the People’s speculative claim that defendant assisted the original thieves “by
providing them with a ready means of disposing of the stolen loot so that they themselves
would not be caught in possession of it.”
We conclude the court’s decision to award the owner restitution for the stolen
truck was an abuse of discretion.
13
DISPOSITION
The order requiring defendant to pay $2,888.96 in victim restitution for the truck
is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
SLOUGH J.
14
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a defendant convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle cannot be ordered to pay restitution for the vehicle's original theft when the theft occurred months prior and the defendant's conduct was not a proximate cause of the victim's economic loss.
Issues
Whether a defendant convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle can be ordered to pay restitution for the vehicle's theft occurring months prior.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution for losses not caused by the defendant's specific criminal conduct.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Defendant cannot be assessed restitution for economic losses that did not result from the crime of which he was convicted.”
“We conclude the court’s decision to award the owner restitution for the stolen truck was an abuse of discretion.”