People v. Laws CA3

Filed 5/24/22 P. v. Laws CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin) ----

THE PEOPLE, C092138

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. STKCRFE19890001261) v.

HARRY DARNELL LAWS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Harry Darnell Laws appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170.95. Defendant argues the trial court erred when it denied his petition without appointing counsel because he made a prima facie showing that his conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In particular, he asserts the court incorrectly engaged in factfinding when it considered the appellate opinion deciding his direct appeal and used the conclusions in that opinion to decide whether he had stated a prima facie case for eligibility under section 1170.95. We affirm.

1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1990, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. In short, defendant was involved in a shooting from a car in which he and three other men were riding. (People v. Laws (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 786, 789.) The victim, who was standing near the actual target of the shooting, was killed. (Ibid.) At trial, the prosecution argued defendant could be found guilty as the actual shooter or, alternatively, as a direct aider or abettor of the shooting by one of the other men in the car. (People v. Laws (Jan. 22, 1993, C009984) [nonpub. opn. portion] (Laws).) The trial court instructed the jury on direct aider/abettor liability using CALJIC No. 3.01 and on the natural and probable consequences doctrine using CALJIC No. 3.02, which read, “One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any criminal act that he knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted. You must determine whether the defendant is guilty of the crime originally contemplated, and, if so, whether the crime charged was a natural and probable consequence of such originally contemplated crime.” After trial, defendant appealed and raised several issues with CALJIC No. 3.02. (Laws, supra, C009984.) We determined the issues were harmless error, saying, “Each of defendant’s arguments fails for the simple reason that the challenged portion of CALJIC No. 3.02 (which addressed vicarious liability for the natural and probable consequences of the originally contemplated crime) was inapplicable under the facts of this case and, thus, was superfluous.” (Ibid.) We reviewed the prosecution’s theory of the case, concluding that, “the vicarious liability theory of guilt was predicated on defendant’s aiding and abetting [the codefendant’s] act of shooting toward [the target victim], which resulted in [the actual victim’s] death, not defendant’s aiding and abetting some other criminal act of which the shooting was a natural and foreseeable consequence. Stated another way, based on the