California Court of Appeal May 19, 2022 No. E076973Unpublished
Filed 5/19/22 Griffin v. Stowe CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DAELANI GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E076973
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVMV2100078)
JULIAN NOEL STOWE, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark E. Johnson, Judge.
Affirmed.
Daelani Griffin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Julian Noel Stowe, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
Daelani Griffin filed a petition for a harassment restraining order against Julian
Noel Stone.1 She claimed Stowe made threatening and insulting social media posts about
her and induced others to do so. The trial court denied the petition. It commented,
1 Despite her traditionally male name, Stowe is female.
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among other things, “This stuff . . . doesn’t even come close to the kind of harassment
that’s required for a civil restraining order. You guys . . . have a spat on Facebook. . . .
Griffin appeals. She contends that the trial court “was not acting as a neutral
based on the law.” She also claims that Stowe’s conduct was civilly and criminally
unlawful.
We will hold that the trial court could properly find that Griffin had not proven the
alleged harassment by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court’s comments were
proper; they show that it ruled based on the appropriate legal standard. Griffin has not
shown that Stowe committed any crime or civil wrong, and moreover has not shown that
if she did, that would necessarily constitute harassment. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Allegations of the Petition.
According to Griffin’s sworn petition, Stowe lived in the State of Washington.
They met in second grade but had not seen each other for 13 years.
According to Griffin, Stowe used her name and likeness in “online rants that
[we]re false.” Stowe sent her harassing messages and had “other ladies whom I do not
know” send her harassing messages. Stowe had sent her a video saying that Griffin had
“a mental illness.” Stowe had described Griffin as “a sugar baby, a prostitute, and a
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cheap hooker.” Stowe had threatened to have Griffin deported2 and to “find [her] in
California and beat the shit out of [her].”
Griffin would block Stowe, but Stowe would just open new accounts.
B. Attachments to the Petition.
Screenshots attached to the petition showed that Stowe had multiple online
accounts. The posts from her shown in the attachment were innocuous and seemingly not
related to Griffin at all. Griffin claimed that one post by Stowe, showing only the top of
someone’s head, was from a “[v]ideo of me talking about [an] unnamed person.”
Another post said, “I wasn’t attacking you unlike you were. Being crazy towards me and
my family. Good try though.”
One post was by one Hana Knowlton. Griffin identified Knowlton as a “[r]andom
associated friend to Julian.” It said: “You’ve got some balls speaking on Rylee and
Julian. There 10x the woman you’ll ever be. You’re a joke. Don’t come crying when
your lifestyle doesn’t work. Because Rylee and Julian have better jobs than you. You’re
petty and worthless. And the reason covid19 will be here a month from now. Stay home.
And maybe learn how to do your makeup and not look like a 12 year old trying to damn
hard. . . . Take your wanna be jordon woods[3] looking ass out of here and leave them
alone. You had no right to speak on anything. You’re scum.”
2 Griffin now claims that Stowe threatened to have her deported “to Africa,” which was “racially inflammatory.” The record does not show this. 3 Apparently referring to reality TV personality Jordyn Woods.
3
Another post was by one Lysa Cole. Griffin labeled Cole a “friend or random
account associated with Julian.” It said, “Bruh you need to chill out and stop harassing
people. It’s absolutely ridiculous and childish. . . . Find someone else to do with your
time. Like working on your closure or take pics that don’t look like your being hurt.”
C. Hearing on the Petition.
Both Griffin and Stowe appeared and testified at the hearing.
Griffin said she watched the videos that Stowe sent her “because my name was
tagged in them.” However, there was at least one that she “didn’t really watch . . . .” She
did not have screenshots of all of the offensive posts because she “started documenting
late . . . .” The last contact she had had with Stowe was in December 2020. Griffin
admitted that she was an American citizen and could not actually be deported.
Stowe said she started messaging Griffin in February 2020, to “reach out to [an]
old friend[] from elementary school.” She had had no contact with her since October or
November 2020.
D. Other Evidence.
Griffin offers us a YouTube link, supposedly to “online rants.” We cannot
consider any evidence that was not presented to the trial court. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 396, 405.)
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II
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In February 2021, Griffin filed a petition for temporary and permanent harassment
restraining orders against Stowe. The trial court denied a temporary restraining order.
Stowe filed a response (not in our record).
In March 2021, after a hearing, the trial court denied a restraining order. It
commented: “[L]et me tell you the kind of stuff that gets heard down here. . . . I had a
young lady who says she was sexually assaulted, and requesting an order. This stuff . . .
doesn’t even come close to the kind of harassment that’s required for a civil restraining
order. You guys . . . have a spat on Facebook. . . . Nobody cares about these s[p]ats.
Just block them and move on. . . . If I put restraining orders on people, I’m giving them
orders to do things — or not to do things that they, otherwise, are legally allowed to do.
They lose their rights to possess firearms. For me, that’s a big deal. They have to stay
away from areas. It goes on their FBI record. So every time a police officer pulls them
over to stop, and if they run a rap sheet they see a restraining order, it will change the
whole nature of the contact. But I can tell you, a restraining order requires unlawful
harassment. A lot more than I’m seeing here. So the Court is going to deny the request
for a restraining order.”
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III
DISCUSSION
A. Forfeiture.
Griffin has forfeited all of her contentions by failing to have Stowe’s response to
the petition included in the appellate record.
“‘It is the duty of an appellant to provide an adequate record to the court
establishing error. Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the
issue be resolved against appellant. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This principle stems from the
well-established rule of appellate review that a judgment or order is presumed correct and
the appellant has the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error. [Citations.] By failing to
provide an adequate record, appellant cannot meet his burden to show error and we must
resolve any challenge to the order against him. [Citation.]” (Hotels Nevada v. L.A.
Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.)
Here, for all we know, Stowe presented evidence proving that the alleged
harassment never occurred. On this record, Griffin cannot show otherwise. Hence, she
cannot carry her burden. We will also discuss Griffin’s contentions on the merits, but
only as an alternative ground for rejecting them.
B. The Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Griffin does not contend, in so many words, that there was insufficient evidence to
support the denial of her petition. However, she does claim that “[t]he judge ignored the
facts”; she asks us “to re-evaluate the [j]udge[’]s decision” and to order the trial court to
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issue the requested injunction. The first question, then, is what the facts actually were.
Legally, they were whatever the trial court could reasonably find them to be, if that
finding was based on substantial evidence and would tend to support the denial.
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 (section 527.6) allows “[a] person who has
suffered harassment” to seek “an order after hearing prohibiting harassment . . . .”
(§ 527.6, subd. (a).)
“Harassment” includes “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which as would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
A “course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose . . . .”
(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)
“At the hearing, . . . [i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that
unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (i).)
“[A]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding
requiring clear and convincing proof must account for the level of confidence this
standard demands. . . . [T]he question before the appellate court is whether the record as
a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have
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found it highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established
principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment
the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility
of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from
the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996.)
Moreover, “‘[w]hen the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the
party with the burden of proof failed to carry that burden and that party appeals, it is
somewhat misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial
evidence supports the judgment.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically,
the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ [Citations.]” (LaFace v.
Ralphs Grocery Company (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 388, 409-410, pet for rev. filed Apr. 1,
2022.)
The trial court did not have to believe the allegations in Griffin’s petition, even
though they were made under penalty of perjury. “[I]n a bench trial, the trial court is the
‘sole judge’ of witness credibility. [Citation.] The trial judge may believe or disbelieve
uncontradicted witnesses if there is any rational ground for doing so. [Citation.] The fact
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finder’s determination of the veracity of a witness is final. [Citation.]” (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.) Griffin had no documentary evidence
that Stowe actually said she had a mental illness, called her a prostitute, threatened to
have her deported, or threatened to beat her. The fact that Griffin did introduce some
posts by Stowe, but those posts were completely inoffensive, tended to show that Griffin
was not credible. Perhaps the trial court could have believed her, even in the absence of
documentary evidence, but it did not have to.
Separately and alternatively, the trial court could find that Stowe did make these
statements, but they would not cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress. People say “You’re crazy” all the time, to express disagreement; saying this
need not cause substantial emotional distress. Being called a “prostitute” or “a cheap
hooker” is no fun, but it is not hard to shake off the insult when it is not true. The threat
to have Griffin deported was not necessarily distressing at all, as she was an American
citizen. And finally, as Stowe was in Washington and Griffin was in California, the
threat to “beat the shit out of [her]” would not necessarily cause substantial emotional
distress.
There was no evidence of the period of time over which these alleged statements
were supposedly made. If they were made all at once — or even, in a fit of pique, over a
few days — they would not necessarily cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress. There also was no evidence of what led Stowe to verbally abuse
Griffin. If Griffin wronged Stowe somehow, it might not be unreasonable for Stowe to
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call her mentally ill and a prostitute and to threaten to beat her — all metaphorically —
and Griffin would be aware of that.
Aside from Griffin’s allegation, there was no evidence that Stowe caused
Knowlton and Cole to send their respective messages. Griffin did not explain how she
knew that Stowe did; thus, the trial court could reasonably disbelieve her. In any event,
as far as the record shows, these posts were one-off events that a reasonable person could
put behind him or her. Cole’s post was not even particularly insulting — it merely said
Griffin was “ridiculous and childish” and looked “hurt” in photos.
As the trial court observed, it appeared that Griffin could just choose not to view
the offensive posts. She admitted that there was at least one video that she did not watch.
She did claim that, when she blocked Stowe, Stowe would just open up a new account.
Even so, the accounts shown in the attachment to the petition all had “Julian” in the name
and featured Stowe’s photo. Thus, Griffin could easily avoid viewing them. She did not
claim that anyone else whom she knew ever saw the posts.
Finally, there was no evidence that the alleged harassment was likely to continue.
“An injunction is authorized only when it appears that wrongful acts are likely to recur.
[Citation.]” (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 402.) Again, there was no
evidence of how long the alleged harassment went on. Griffin admitted that, at the time
of the hearing, she had not heard from Stowe for three or four months; Stowe claimed it
had been more like four or five months. And again, the posts by Knowlton and Cole
were apparently one-offs.
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In sum, Griffin’s evidence of purported harassment was not “uncontradicted and
unimpeached”; it left ample “room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding,” particularly under the “clear and convincing” standard of proof.
For these reasons, the trial court could properly deny the petition.
C. Judicial Bias.
Griffin argues that the trial court erred by taking into consideration the effect of a
protective order on a defendant. Taking its remarks as a whole, however, clearly that was
not a determinative consideration. Rather, it used the effect of a protective order on a
defendant — e.g., loss of the right to possess firearms, loss of the right to be in certain
areas, and a criminal record — to explain to Griffin why the standard for granting a
restraining order is as high as it is. It concluded that it was deciding the case under the
correct legal standard: “[A] restraining order requires unlawful harassment. A lot more
than I’m seeing here.”
Griffin also complains that these remarks show “personal bias.” She forfeited any
claim of judicial bias by failing to bring a disqualification motion below. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1); People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1110-1111,
disapproved on unrelated grounds in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151; see also
Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1339.)
She additionally forfeited any such claim by failing to file a prompt writ petition.
An appellate court can review a claim of judicial bias only by writ, not by appeal. (Code
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Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 304, disapproved
on unrelated grounds in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53, fn. 19.)
We hasten to add that she has not shown so much as a hint of bias. As already
discussed, the trial court’s ruling was legally correct; Griffin merely felt that it slighted
her concerns. In any event, “‘a trial court’s . . . rulings against a party — even when
erroneous — do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to
review.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1110.)
D. Illegality.
Griffin argues that Stowe’s conduct was criminal, because it constituted stalking
(Pen. Code, § 646.9), repeated electronic communication with the intent to harass (Pen.
Code, § 653m, subd. (b)), posting personal identifying information for the purposes of
causing harassment by a third party (Pen. Code, § 653.2, subd. (a)), and making a
criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422). She also argues that Stowe’s conduct was civilly
actionable as false-light invasion of privacy, defamation, and — because it caused her to
suffer anxiety — under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
She does not lay out the elements of any of these crimes and causes of action; she
does not explain how Stowe’s conduct satisfied those elements. “To demonstrate error,
appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.]” (In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) We deem the contention forfeited.
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Griffin also does not explain why a crime or civil wrong is necessarily
“harassment” as defined in section 527.6. For example, a couple of instances of
defamation would not necessarily constitute a “course of conduct.”
In any event, as already discussed, the trial court could reasonably find that Stowe
did not actually say Griffin had a mental illness, call her a prostitute, threaten to have her
deported, or threaten to beat her. On that view of the evidence, there was no crime and
no civil wrong.
IV
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition is affirmed. In the interest of justice, we do not
award costs to either side.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
SLOUGH J.
FIELDS J.
13
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court properly denied the petition for a harassment restraining order because the plaintiff failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct constituting unlawful harassment.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petition for a harassment restraining order.
Whether the trial court demonstrated judicial bias.
Whether the appellant met her burden of proof to establish harassment under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We will hold that the trial court could properly find that Griffin had not proven the alleged harassment by clear and convincing evidence.”
“The trial court’s comments were proper; they show that it ruled based on the appropriate legal standard.”
“Griffin’s evidence of purported harassment was not “uncontradicted and unimpeached”; it left ample “room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding,” particularly under the “clear and convincing” standard of proof.”