People v. Beteta CA1/1
Filed 3/24/22 P. v. Beteta CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A163144 v. JOSE NAPOLEON BETETA, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. H43032A) Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In 2008, defendant Jose Napoleon Beteta was convicted of first degree murder, with a special circumstance that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery.2 He was 25 years old at the time of the offense, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). His conviction has long been final, and it is not at issue in the cause before us. (See People v. Beteta (Apr. 29, 2009, A121059) [nonpub. opn].) What is at issue is whether the trial court correctly determined that Beteta was not entitled to a “Franklin proceeding,” which allows young
We resolve this cause by memorandum opinion in accordance with 1
California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. 2 Beteta’s conviction and special circumstance determination were
based on Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), and 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A). All statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
1
offenders to develop a post-judgment record for use in future parole hearings. (See People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 284.) Under existing law, offenders who have LWOP sentences and who were over the age of 18 at the time of their offense will not become eligible for parole. (See § 3051, subd. (h).) But offenders who have LWOP sentences and who were 18 or younger at the time of their offense will become eligible for parole— notwithstanding their LWOP sentence—after 15, 20, or 25 years of incarceration, depending on the nature of their underlying offense. (See § 3051, subd. (b).)3 Because this latter category of offenders will eventually be eligible for parole, they have an interest in developing a post-judgment record to document information about “youth-related factors, such as [the offender’s] cognitive ability, character, and social and family background.” (Franklin, at p. 269.) This information may prove useful when these offenders become parole eligible because the parole board “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner.” (§ 4801, subd. (c).) The trial court here denied Beteta’s request for a Franklin proceeding because Beteta was over 25 years old at the time of his offense and is therefore ineligible for future parole consideration. On appeal, Beteta contends that under equal protection principles he should be entitled to the same opportunity for a Franklin proceeding as is afforded to juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences who were 18 or under at the time of their offenses.
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