California Court of Appeal Jan 12, 2022 No. E076366Unpublished
Filed 1/12/22 P. v. Zendejas CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E076366
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1102423)
JAVIER SOLORIO ZENDEJAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Godofredo Magno, Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Offices of Michael Poole and Michael Poole for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Eric A. Swenson and Marvin
E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In 2011, Javier Solorio Zendejas pled guilty to manufacturing or transporting
deceptive identification documents. In 2019, he filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea,
alleging he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea. (Pen. Code,
§ 1473.7, unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) The trial judge denied this
motion. In October 2020, Zendejas filed another motion, nearly identical to the first,
Zendejas now appeals the denial of his second motion. He argues he demonstrated
that he is eligible for relief by attesting he didn’t understand the immigration
consequences of his plea, particularly because after his plea changes to immigration law
made it much more likely his conviction would subject him to immigration
consequences. The People argue Zendejas’s motion is collaterally estopped, and in any
case his argument fails on the merits. We agree with the People on both points.
I
FACTS
On July 18, 2011, Zendejas pled guilty to manufacturing or transporting deceptive
identification documents (§ 483.5, subd. (a)) for possessing a forged social security card
and a forged permanent resident card. The judge sentenced him to three years’ probation.
Before entering this plea, Zendejas’s trial counsel explained that he was on an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold. The judge explained that re-entering the
country illegally would violate his probation conditions, and Zendejas said he
understood. The judge didn’t advise Zendejas that his plea could carry immigration
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consequences, but Zendejas did sign a plea form in which he acknowledged he
understood his “conviction may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization.”
In July 2019, Zendejas filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea under
section 1473.7. He argued that when he pled guilty, he didn’t understand his crime could
constitute a crime of moral turpitude under immigration law, which could have
significant immigration consequences. He also argued these potential consequences
became more likely after various immigration law decisions that clarified which crimes
are considered crimes of moral turpitude. In his accompanying declaration, he said he
wasn’t advised of any potential immigration consequences and wouldn’t have accepted
the plea had he known what they were.
The trial judge held a hearing on Zendejas’s motion in August 2019 that consisted
of oral argument by counsel. After hearing argument, the judge made the factual finding
that “Zendejas understood what the immigration consequences were at the time he pled.”
The judge reasoned that even though cases decided after Zendejas’s plea may have
affected the potential immigration consequences, Zendejas nevertheless “understood the
nature of the plea” at the time he entered it. Accordingly, the judge denied the motion.
Zendejas did not appeal this denial.
In October 2020, Zendejas filed another section 1473.7 motion, which, in all
relevant regards, was identical to his first. The only material difference is that in the
second motion, he argued the sentencing judge violated section 1016.5 by failing to
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advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea on the record. The same judge
who ruled on the first motion held a hearing on the second. At the hearing, the judge
noted, “I had already ruled on this motion back in August of 2019. I actually pulled that
transcript, and I read it as well, and it does appear that I ruled on it.” Zendejas’s counsel
argued he raised a new ground for relief by alleging a section 1016.5 violation, but the
judge said, “my reading of the transcript in the prior proceeding, it’s something that I
addressed regarding your first points . . . it appear[s] that . . . the new issues you [are]
bringing up, I actually had addressed in the prior motion.” Accordingly, the judge stated,
“I do believe that I’ve ruled on it; so you are estopped from bringing that up again.”
Despite concluding Zendejas was estopped from bringing the second motion, the
judge issued a written order denying the motion on its merits.
Zendejas filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
Zendejas argues the judge denied his second motion in error because opinions
issued after he entered his plea increased the likelihood he would be deported for
committing a crime of moral turpitude. The People argue Zendejas’s second motion is
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and fails on its merits in any case. We agree
with the People.
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“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior
proceedings.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) The doctrine of
collateral estoppel applies when “(1) [a] claim or issue raised in the present action is
identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding
resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is
being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” (People v.
Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253.) In short, if a party has already litigated and lost on
a given issue, they are barred from raising it again.
Each element of collateral estoppel is satisfied here. As for the first element, the
2019 and 2020 motions assert the same ground for relief, namely, that changes in
immigration law made after Zendejas entered his plea made his deportation more likely,
and had he known those changes would occur, he would not have taken the deal. As for
the third element, the parties were identical in the 2019 and 2020 motions.
Finally, the second element is satisfied because the denial order constitutes a final
judgment on the issue. Motions brought under section 1473.7 are appealable as motions
after judgment affecting the substantial rights of a party and become final if not appealed
within 60 days. (§ 1473.7, subd. (f); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) As noted,
Zendejas did not appeal the denial order and as a result it was final long before he filed
his second motion.
Nevertheless, Zendejas argued at the trial court level—though not in his briefing
here—that his second motion asserted a new ground for relief by claiming the sentencing
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judge violated section 1016.5’s requirement of an on-the-record advisement. Contrary to
his assertions below, this was not a new ground for relief. The judge was aware of the
alleged section 1016.5 violation during the hearing on the first motion and made his
decision with the allegation in mind. The judge explained it was immaterial whether the
sentencing judge had violated section 1016.5 because the record demonstrated “Zendejas
understood what the immigration consequences were at the time he pled.” That is, the
court concluded that regardless of whether Zendejas was or wasn’t properly advised, he
was not prejudiced by this alleged error because he did understand the terms of his plea
and its potential immigration consequences at the time he pled. Therefore, Zendejas
already litigated and lost on this issue, and was collaterally estopped from raising it again.
We also agree with the People that even if Zendejas’s motion was not barred by
collateral estoppel, it would fail on the merits. Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1),
requires the moving party to demonstrate “prejudicial error damaging [their] ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences.” But the misunderstanding Zendejas alleges
postdates his plea, and therefore necessarily could not have affected his ability to
understand and accept the potential immigration consequences. Postplea changes in the
law do not affect a defendant’s contemporaneous understanding of the consequences of
their plea agreement. Therefore, even if Zendejas were not collaterally estopped from
bringing this motion, we would nevertheless conclude the trial judge properly denied the
motion on its merits.
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III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Zendejas’s section 1473.7 motion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
7
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant's second motion to withdraw his guilty plea was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issues had been litigated and decided in a prior, final proceeding. Furthermore, the court held that the motion failed on its merits because post-plea changes in immigration law do not establish the requisite prejudicial error regarding the defendant's understanding at the time of the plea.
Issues
Whether the defendant's second motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Penal Code section 1473.7 was barred by collateral estoppel.
Whether post-plea changes in immigration law can establish prejudicial error under Penal Code section 1473.7.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.”
“Postplea changes in the law do not affect a defendant’s contemporaneous understanding of the consequences of their plea agreement.”