People v. Argeta

[1480]Opinion

EPSTEIN, P. J. Defendants Cristian Argeta and Camilo Hernandez appeal from a jury verdict convicting them of one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and five counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664).1 We vacated submission and received further briefing in light of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291] (Caballero) and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S._ [183 L.Ed.2d 407, 132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller). In the published portion of this opinion we discuss the application of these decisions to the punishment imposed on the appellants. Based on that analysis, we affirm as to Argeta but conclude the trial court’s sentencing determinations regarding Hernandez must be reversed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY* *

DISCUSSION

I-VI*

VII

Defendants argue that their sentences constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions. As stated, we vacated earlier submission to consider the recent decisions.

Hernandez claims that because he was 15 years old when the crimes were committed, he was convicted of homicide only as an aider and abettor, and his sentence is functionally equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, the sentence is cruel and unusual under the federal Constitution as well as cruel [1481]or unusual under the California Constitution. (See Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [176 L.Ed.2d 825, 130 S.Ct. 2011] (Graham); People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 870] (Mendez); Miller, supra, 567 U.S._[132 S.Ct. 2455]; Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th 262.)

In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p._[130 S.Ct at p. 2034].) The court noted the “fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” and that juveniles are “more capable of change than are adults.” (Id. at p._ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2026].) The Supreme Court next took up the issue in Miller, two companion cases in which minors were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. _ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2460].) Based on the reasoning in Graham, the court held that it also is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to impose a mandatory life-without-parole sentence upon a juvenile in a homicide case. (Miller, at pp. - [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2467-2468].) The court concluded that such penalties “preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it,” namely, “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” (Ibid.) Although Miller was a homicide case, the court pointed out that Graham’s consideration of the unique characteristics and vulnerabilities of juveniles is not “crime-specific” and its “reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile” even if Graham’s categorical ban regarding nonhomicide offenses did not. (Miller, at p._[132 S.Ct. at p. 2465].)