People v. Nunez

Opinion

VEGAN, J. This appeal concerns the M’Naghten insanity test (M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 [8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722]) and the Legislature’s proscription against multiple punishment as specified in Penal Code section 654.1 This is an intersection that legal scholars may find interesting. If a defendant has been convicted of multiple offenses but was legally insane at the time of the offenses, how does a sentencing judge or an appellate court determine his “intent and objective” in setting a maximum period of potential confinement? Such a defendant is incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or if he did know or understand, he cannot distinguish right from wrong. (See People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752]; see also Clark v. Arizona (2006) 548 U.S. 735, 747 [165 L.Ed.2d 842, 858-859, 126 S.Ct. 2709].) But such a defendant may still have an “intent and objective.” It is just a little more difficult to ascertain.

Section 654 jurisprudence speaks in terms of the “intent and objective of the actor.” (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507 [98 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 213 P.3d 647], italics omitted.) This indicates that the actor’s “subjective” intent is the touchstone for the multiple punishment inquiry.2 We question whether a sentencing court, an appellate court, or even a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist can, in reality, reliably determine the subjective intent of an insane person. We nevertheless attempt to do so.

[628]Jose Nunez appeals from an order committing him to Patton State Hospital for a maximum period of 17 years (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)) after he was convicted of carjacking (count 1; § 215, subd. (a)) and assault with a deadly weapon (ADW; count 2; § 245, subd. (a)(1)) with weapon use and great bodily injury (GBI) enhancements (§ 12022, subd. (b)(2); former § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The jury found that appellant was insane when he committed the offenses. (§ 1026, subd. (a).) The trial court, in calculating the maximum period of confinement, computed the maximum sentence as follows: 15 years on count 1 for carjacking and the GBI and weapon use enhancements; plus a consecutive two-year term on count 2 for ADW and a GBI enhancement. We conclude that section 654 limits the maximum confinement period to 15 years.

On March 3, 2010, appellant was admitted to a mental health inpatient facility at the Ventura County Medical Center pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Appellant escaped the next day, hit Anthony Perez (hereafter victim) with a hammer outside a convalescent home, and took his Grand Cherokee Jeep. Appellant was arrested hours later after he “rolled” the Jeep on Highway 101 near Santa Maria.