People v. F.D.

Opinion

WISEMAN, Acting P. J. This case presents the question of whether Proposition 21 abolished probation without any confinement time as a disposition in juvenile delinquency proceedings which the prosecutor had the option of filing directly in adult court, but chose to file in juvenile court. It is unnecessary for us to answer that question, however, because here the juvenile court imposed a 30-day juvenile hall commitment in addition to probation. We reject the People’s contention that the juvenile hall commitment did not count because the court also granted the minor 30 days’ credit for time served and ordered him immediately to begin serving his probation in the custody of his mother. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES

As part of a plea bargain, F.D. admitted charges of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)), second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and disobeying an antigang injunction (Pen. Code, § 166, former subd. (a)(9)). Two other counts were dismissed. He was 16 at the time of the offenses.

The probation officer recommended probation: “In regards to dispositional alternatives, the Probation Department strongly considered a commitment to the Tulare County Youth Facility (YF). It appears the minor would benefit from the treatment, training and counseling available at the Youth Facility (YF). However, the minor has never been on formal probation and has not had the opportunity to redirect his behavior under the supervision of a probation officer. The probation officer will make regular contacts with the minor and his family, provide additional support and supervision for the minor, assist in linking the minor with agencies and services to address his needs and issues, and monitor the minor’s compliance with his terms and conditions of probation. Therefore, such a commitment was determined to be unwarranted at this time.”

[889]The prosecutor objected to this proposed disposition. He argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)(5),1 required a custodial commitment and that the 31 days he had already served when he was initially detained on these charges should not be counted as a custodial commitment.