People v. Crivello
Before: Robie
Opinion
ROBIE, J. Under the Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) Act individuals convicted of particular enumerated violent offenses may be required to receive mental health treatment. (Lopez v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1055, 1057 [116 Cal.Rptr.3d 530, 239 P.3d 1228] (Lopez).) As relevant in this case, in order to commit a prisoner as an MDO under Penal Code1 section 2962, the People must prove that his “severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the commission of a crime for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison.” (§ 2962, subd. (b).) “The MDO Act provides for treatment of certified MDO’s at three stages of commitment: as a condition of parole [(§ 2962)], in conjunction with the extension of parole [(§ 2966, subd. (c))], and following release from parole [(§ 2970)]. Section 2962 governs the first of the three commitment phases, setting forth the six criteria necessary to establish MDO status . . . .” {Lopez, at pp. 1061-1062.) Three of the six criteria under section 2962 are foundational and need only be established at the initial section 2962 hearing. The other three criteria are dynamic and must be established at each annual review of commitment. {Lopez, at pp. 1062-1063.)
Defendant Michael Anthony Crivello appeals an order of civil commitment as an MDO under section 2970. He contends that because he was never committed as a an MDO under section 2962, he could not be recommitted as an MDO under section 2970. The People properly concede. We shall reverse.
[615]RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2003, defendant was charged with second degree robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor resisting arrest.2 He was found incompetent to stand trial and proceedings were suspended until July 2004. Once proceedings were reinstated, defendant pled no contest to second degree robbery and the remaining counts were dismissed. The San Luis Obispo court sentenced him to a two-year state prison term.
In September 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings3 determined defendant met the criteria of section 2962 as an MDO and sustained the condition he undergo mental health treatment as a condition of parole. Defendant challenged this determination and at an April 2006 trial on the matter, two psychiatric experts offered conflicting opinions. (§ 2966, subd. (b).) Dr. Mendenhall concluded defendant’s mental illness was probably among the reasons he committed the robbery. Dr. Phenix concluded defendant was malingering, did not have a mental disorder, and any such disorder was not a cause or aggravating factor in his offense. Based on the conflicting expert testimony, and the tentative nature of Dr. Mendenhall’s opinions, the court4 found there was a reasonable doubt whether defendant had a substantial mental disorder that was a causative or aggravating factor in the robbery. The standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 2966, subd. (b).)
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