People v. H.C.

Opinion

RUSHING, P. J. This appeal is taken under Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (a) and the minor H.C. appeals from the dispositional order in a juvenile court proceeding pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.

A wardship petition filed October 10, 2008, alleged that the ward carried a concealed weapon and a loaded firearm. The minor admitted to violating Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (a)(2), a felony, and all other counts were dismissed. He was placed on probation for three years and an order was signed by the trial judge. The probation order, a preprinted form, is of three pages and contains 35 conditions.

Discussion

Defendant asserts the probation conditions related to his gang association are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

While defendant did not object to the probation conditions when they were imposed in the juvenile court, we do not deem the issue waived on [1070]appeal. In In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282], the California Supreme Court held in a juvenile case that a failure to object to a probation condition on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is not waived on appeal. We apply the same rule to this case.

“A probation condition is subject to the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine, and thus ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him ....’” (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 630 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 66] (Lopez).) “The underlying concern of the vagueness doctrine is the core due process requirement of adequate notice-. [][] ‘ “No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” [Citations.] . . . [f] ‘. . . Thus, a law that is “void for vagueness” not only fails to provide adequate notice to those who must observe its strictures, but also “impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115-1116 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277, 929 P.2d 596] (Acuna).) Acuna involved the defendants’ attack on a preliminary decree obtained by the City of San Jose that enjoined them from associating with other gang members. At issue was the existence of a knowledge requirement in the injunction. There, the court acknowledged that “the City would have to establish a defendant’s own knowledge of his associate’s gang membership to meet its burden of proving conduct in violation of the injunction. Far from being a ‘classic’ instance of constitutional vagueness, however, we think the element of knowledge is fairly implied in the decree. To the extent that it might not be, we are confident that the trial court will, as the Court of Appeal did in People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 103 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340], impose such a limiting construction ... by inserting a knowledge requirement should an attempt be made to enforce that paragraph of the injunction.” (Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1117, italics omitted.)