Orange County Social Services Agency v. Daisy R.

Opinion

IKOLA, J. Daisy R. (mother) appeals from a postjudgment order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 terminating her parental rights to her 20-month-old daughter, Brandy R., and freeing the child for adoption. Mother’s sole contention is that the trial court had no.jurisdiction to hold the .26 hearing until issuance of the remittitur after our denial of mother’s previous writ petition. (Daisy R. v. Superior Court (Sept. 1, 2006, G037130) [nonpub. opn.].) The petition pertained to orders at the six-month review hearing when the court scheduled the .26 hearing. (§ 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452, formerly rule 38.1.)

In light of the very narrow issue before us, we need not reiterate the material or discuss events leading up to the time of the .26 hearing. We note that despite the vast array of supportive services provided to mother through the duration óf two dependency proceedings, her cognitive limitations presented an insurmountable hurdle to her acquisition of parenting skills adequate to protect her child. Brandy, now nearly two years old, is transitioning for adoption by the caregivers who have provided a home for her since shortly after her birth. She has bonded with her four-year-old brother, Nathan, earlier adopted by the same family.

DISCUSSION

Mother argues the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to commence the scheduled .26 hearing on October 19, 2006','because the matter was automatically stayed pending issuance of the remittitur from the prior writ proceeding. We disagree.

As a general rule, under Code of Civil Procedure section 916, an appeal stays further proceedings in the trial court regarding matters embraced in or affected by the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. But [610]an appeal is not a writ proceeding. An appeal is taken by right; a writ is an extraordinary, discretionary remedy. We see no basis for interpreting Code of Civil Procedure section 916 as equating the two. The manifest distinction between writ review and appeal is particularly well illuminated in juvenile dependency proceedings by the provisions of section 366.26, subdivision (l), which conditions the right to appeal an . order setting the .26 hearing on, inter alia, a summary denial of a timely petition for extraordinary writ review. Thus, the Legislature clearly knows the difference between an appeal and extraordinary writ review and easily could have included language to accommodate an automatic stay in writ proceedings, but it did not. Longstanding rules of statutory construction, as repeated in People ex rel. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Muhyeldin (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 604 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 492], prohibit us from rewriting the statute by inserting words of our own: “ 1 “[I]t still remains true, as it always has, that there can be no intent in a statute not expressed in its words, and there can be no intent upon the part of the framers of such a statute which does not find expression in their words.” [Citations.] . : . “Words may not be inserted in a statute under the guise of interpretation.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 611.)