Kern County Department of Human Services v. Karen A.

Opinion

BUCKLEY, J. The Kern County Department of Human Services (County) appeals the granting of reunification services to respondents, which was premised on the court’s finding inapplicable Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).1 On appeal, the County argues the court too narrowly construed the term “sibling” in the statute. We will affirm the judgment.

Discussion

After gaining her majority, Tara K. reported years of rape and other sexual abuse by respondents, who had been her legal guardians. Juvenile authorities removed respondents’ other ward, 14-year-old Tanyann W., for whom they were legal guardians, and their biological child, 7-year-old Katie A. The County recommended against providing reunification services for Tanyann and Katie at disposition, relying on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), which permits such denial in the case of “severe sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half-sibling by a parent or guardian, . . .” The court reluctantly ruled that the statute did not apply: “While this court would urge the legislature to consider adding step-siblings and what is commonly referred to as ‘foster sisters/brothers’ to this section, the legislature has not currently done so. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply this section to this case. The child sexually assaulted by [respondents] was neither the sibling nor half-sibling of [Katie A.] or Tanyann W.]. Therefore, the court must order reunification services to both parents/legal guardians at this time.” At the continued disposition hearing, the court adjudged the children dependents under section 300, subdivisions [678](b) and (d), adopted the case plan, and ordered reunification services to be provided.2

The sole issue on appeal is the meaning of the term “sibling” in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). The County argues that the sibling relationship is legal, not biological, such that siblings are children who share a legal tie to at least one common parent. To support this contention, the County cites the definition of sibling provided in the code in connection with sibling visitation (§ 362.1, subd. (c)) and sibling group placement (§ 16002): “As used in this section, ‘sibling’ means a child related to another person by blood, adoption, or affinity through a common legal or biological parent.” To find otherwise, appellant contends, would lead to a result anomalous and abhorrent. Respondent Karen A. argues that to afford the term anything other than its common meaning would be to rewrite the statute. Respondent Hector A. finds applicable the definition cited by appellant, but argues that even under that definition, these children are not siblings.