Carlton v. D'Alessandro
Before: Mallano
Opinion
MALLANO, J. In this family law case, the husband sought to reduce spousal and child support in connection with a request for custody of one of the children of the marriage. The trial court granted the custody request but increased the husband’s support payments based on two factors.
First, the trial court assigned the husband a tax filing status of “married filing jointly.” In fact, the husband had remarried, and his tax filing status [1216]was “married filing separately” because his new wife refused to file a joint return. Second, the trial court allocated a tax deduction to the husband based on his new wife’s mortgage payments notwithstanding that the property was purchased with her separate funds, the mortgage was in her name only, and she took the entire deduction.
We conclude that the trial court erred in those respects because, in calculating support, the husband’s net disposable income should reflect his actual, available tax status and deductions.
Background
In November 1978, David Carlton and Catherine Ann D’Alessandro were married. Two children, a daughter and a son, were bom during the marriage. In January 1994, David and Catherine separated. On September 15, 1995, a judgment of dissolution was entered. Catherine was awarded custody of the children.
In early 1996, David was to be remarried. His fiancée, Donna, insisted on a premarital agreement to ensure that she remained the sole owner of her separate property. On January 4, 1996, David and Donna signed a “Premarital Agreement,” which provided for the segregation and separate ownership of their respective funds and assets. After they married, Donna was careful to maintain separately her property and finances.
Beginning in 1996, David filed his federal and state tax returns using the status “married filing separately.” He could not file a joint return because Donna refused to do so. She wanted to preserve her separate property as contemplated by the Premarital Agreement and viewed the filing of separate returns as in furtherance of that purpose.
In January 1999, Donna purchased a new home. David was not a party to the sales purchase agreement or the loan. His name was on the deed, but, according to Donna, that was done for “inheritance purposes only.” Donna made every mortgage payment, using her individual checking account that contained her separate funds. The 1999 Internal Revenue Service form 1098, entitled “Mortgage Interest Statement,” showed Donna as the “payer/borrower.” On her tax returns, Donna claimed the entire mortgage interest deduction.
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