Santa Ana Unified School District v. Orange County Development Agency
Before: Rylaarsdam
Opinion
RYLAARSDAM, J. Defendants Orange County Development Agency, the County of Orange, and David E. Sundstrom appeal from a summary judgment ordering them to pay plaintiff Santa Ana Unified School District certain property tax revenues. Defendants contend plaintiff was required to elect to receive such funds, and failed to do so timely, thereby negating any right to allocation of the funds. Plaintiff argues, and the trial court agreed, that defendants’ allocation and payment of the funds were mandatory, making plaintiff’s election automatic. We affirm.
Facts
The facts in this case are simple and not in dispute. In 1986, defendants adopted the Santa Ana Heights Redevelopment Project (project) under the Community Redevelopment Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 33000 et seq.; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated). The project falls within plaintiff’s boundaries.
In 1996, plaintiff adopted a resolution electing to be paid its share of the annual 2 percent inflationary increase in property tax assessment revenues (2 percent tax) pursuant to section 33676. Defendants denied the request for lack of a timely election, maintaining that plaintiff was required to make such election before the project was adopted in 1986. In 1999, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel defendants to disburse the 2 percent tax funds to it from and after 1996.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not required to adopt a formal election to receive the funds, but the 2 percent tax payment was automatically allocated to it because of its status as a school district. Defendants argued they had no duty to allocate the funds because plaintiff failed to make an election to receive the funds and then notify defendants before the project was adopted, as required under section 33676. The court granted plaintiff’s motion and entered judgment, ordering defendants to pay plaintiff not quite $90,000, the amount of the 2 percent fimds due plaintiff for 1996 through 2000, plus interest at 8 percent, and to pay [408]plaintiff’s share of the 2 percent increases thereafter until the project expired.
Discussion
Application of Section 33676
This case revolves around the meaning of section 33676. Before an amendment in 1984, the section provided that “[pjrior to the adoption by the legislative body of a redevelopment plan . . . any affected taxing agency may elect to be allocated ... all or any portion of the tax revenues . . . .” (Former § 33676, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1977, ch. 579, § 130, pp. 1878-1879.) The amended section contains the language at issue here: “Prior to the adoption by the legislative body of a redevelopment plan . . . any affected taxing agency may elect, and every school . . . district shall elect, to be allocated ... all or any portion of the tax revenues . . . .” (Former § 33676, subd. (a), Stats. 1984, ch. 147, § 15, p. 510, italics added.) Since 1984, the statute allows some taxing authorities, but requires plaintiff, to elect allocation of funds. (Ibid.)
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