Carlson v. Blatt
Before: Yegan
Opinion
YEGAN, Acting P. J. In this action for legal malpractice, John Robin Carlson appeals from the summary judgment granted in favor of Attorney [648]James E. Blatt and James E. Blatt, a professional corporation (Blatt). (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)1 Carlson claims that he was wrongfully convicted of 13 felony counts in 1988 because of Blatt’s professional negligence. We conclude that the action is time-barred and affirm the summary judgment. (§§ 340.6, subd. (a), 352.1.)
Factual and Procedural History
In 1988, appellant was convicted by jury of five counts of corporal injury to a child (hereafter the child counts) and thirteen counts of corporal injury to a spouse, assault with a firearm, sexual battery, spousal rape, sodomy by force, and forcible oral copulation (hereafter the spouse counts). {People v. Carlson (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 1988, No. A575276).) Appellant discharged Blatt and moved for new trial on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. On April 14, 1989, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced appellant to 26 years in state prison.
The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in an unpublished opinion. {People v. Carlson (Aug. 26, 1991, B042493).) Appellant filed several writ petitions which were denied by the trial court, the Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court.
In November 1995, he petitioned a federal court for habeas corpus relief. {Carlson v. Ratelle (C.D. Cal., No. 94-2096 LGB).) Based on a federal magistrate’s report, the United States District Court found that appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel and reversed the convictions on the spouse counts only. Thereafter, the district attorney declined to retry appellant on those counts. Appellant was released from custody, having already served the maximum sentence on the child counts. ,
On May 6, 1997, appellant filed suit for professional negligence. Blatt moved for summary judgment on two theories: collateral estoppel and statute of limitations. Relying on Weiner v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 39 [170 Cal.Rptr. 533], the trial court ruled that appellant was collaterally estopped by the extant “child counts.”
Discussion
In this emerging area of the law (see Wiley v. County of San Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4th 532, 547 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 966 P.2d 983] (cone. opn. of Werdegar, J.)), we exercise judicial restraint. We do not reach the merits of the collateral estoppel contention. Instead we decide the appeal on the
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