People v. Rangel

[352]Opinion

RYLAARSDAM, J. J.In this case, we hold a trial court has discretion to order a diagnostic evaluation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 (all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated) where the indicated sentence plus the defendant’s age do not exceed 25 years. We reject the prosecution’s contention that, in order to determine eligibility for a study, the court may consider only the greatest term which can be imposed rather than the actual term the court intends to impose.

Since the trial court accepted the refusal of the California Youth Authority (CYA) to conduct an evaluation of defendant William Rangel and sentenced him to state prison without the benefit of such a study, we remand the case for resentencing.

Facts

In 1996, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 192, subd. (a)) and assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), and returned true findings on allegations he personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)), and inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7) as to each count. At the time of the crime, defendant was 17 years old; by the time of his conviction he was 18.

During a posttrial hearing, the court considered the question whether to send defendant to the CYA for a diagnostic evaluation. The court indicated it might impose a prison sentence of seven years, and continued the matter to allow the parties to research whether section 1732.6 prohibited commitment to the CYA. At a second posttrial hearing, the parties agreed that, if the court imposed a seven-year sentence, section 1732.6 would not bar a CYA commitment. The court referred defendant to the CYA.

A court clerk prepared a document entitled “Report — Indeterminate Sentence, or Other Sentence Choice.” The document erroneously stated defendant was convicted of attempted murder and assault with a semiautomatic weapon. The CYA sent the court a letter, in part, concluding, a “review)]” of “the documents submitted on this case” reflected “the defendant is statutorily ineligible for commitment per [section] 1732.6.”

The court held another hearing, and after noting receipt of the CYA’s letter, concluded “it would be fruitless to try to do anything” other than