L.A. Cty. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. Roy L.

Opinion

EPSTEIN, J. Roy L. (Father) appeals an order of the juvenile court that provides “[fjather to have no visitation rights [with children] without permission of minors’ therapists.” Father contends this order unlawfully delegates judicial authority to the therapists. We agree. We therefore reverse and remand to the juvenile court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a visitation order.

Factual and Procedural Summary

Father has two children—Donnovan, bom July 7, 1991, and Jazzalynn, bom June 16, 1993. Father’s children were declared dependent children [1476]under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 based on findings of sexual abuse to Donnovan and the children’s exposure to violent confrontations between parents. When termmating its jurisdiction the juvenile court issued an order stating: “Father to have no visitation rights without permission of minors’ therapists. Father’s visitation is further contingent upon compliance with Dependency Court ordered psychological counseling. Father’s visitation is further contingent upon proof of . . . successful participation in Dependency Court ordered psychological counseling and a recommendation from Father’s therapist. Father’s visits are thereafter to be monitored.”

Discussion

The superior court, sitting in dependency cases such as this, has the power and responsibility to regulate visitation between dependent children and their parents. (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 705]; In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 754 [270 Cal.Rptr. 326]; § 362.4.) To satisfy this responsibility, a court must “define the rights of the parties to visitation.” (In re Jennifer G., supra, 221 CaI.App.3d 752, 757.) The court may delegate “ministerial tasks of overseeing the right [to visitation] as defined by the court” to a child protective services agency. (Ibid.) Within guidelines established by the court, the child protective services agency may exercise flexibility in managing the visitation. (In re Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375; In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1237 [255 Cal.Rptr. 344]; but see In re Jennifer G„ supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 757 [stating in dicta that a court should determine frequency and length of visitation].)

A court’s delegation to a private therapist, as in this case, raises additional concerns. Unlike a child protective services agency, a private therapist is not statutorily bound to “act as a cooperative arm of the juvenile court.” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 213 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 866, 913 P.2d 1075].) A private therapist is not accountable to the court in the same manner as a child protective services agency.