Orange Cty. Soc. Serv. Agency v. Christopher M.

[850]Opinion

SILLS, P. J. After this appeal was filed, the appellant, Christopher M., was convicted of felony child abuse arising out of the death of a four-month-old child. (See Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) Christopher is now serving a six-year term in Wasco state prison.

In particular, Christopher’s conviction arose out of the January 1994 death of four-month-old Alexander M., who, if he had lived, would have been the elder brother of Alexis M., who was bom in September 1994. Christopher was arrested for child abuse on November 16, 1994, two months after the birth of Alexis, and was convicted in September 1996. A petition to declare Alexis a dependent of the juvenile court was filed the day of the arrest. Christopher pled no contest to the allegations in the petition, which were based on the death of Alexander.

Christopher filed this appeal from orders made at a six-month review completed in May 1996, arguing that the juvenile court should have found him to be a presumed father at the dispositional hearing in September 1995 and therefore entitled to reunification services. Christopher was accorded presumed father status in March of 1996 and given reunification services then, but the services were terminated again in November 1996, when the juvenile court found, at a 12-month review, that reunification would be detrimental to Alexis. While Christopher had been convicted of felony child abuse arising out of the death of Alexander by November 1996, that fact was not one of the bases of the trial court’s decision. After learning of the conviction, this court specifically requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether Christopher’s appeal should not be dismissed as moot, or the judgment otherwise affirmed, because of it.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4) stated, at the time of Christopher’s conviction, that reunification services “need not” be provided a parent who “has been convicted of causing the death of another child through abuse or neglect.” Changes in the statute effective January 1, 1997, make the law even less favorable to Christopher. There is no longer the requirement of a conviction—simply a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “caused” the death of another minor.1

There is no dispute that very serious acts of abuse perpetrated within the home occurred in this case, resulting in the death of a child. Such abuse is