Zepeda v. City of Los Angeles

California Court of Appeal Aug 3, 1990 No. No. B045924Published

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Holding. The court held that emergency rescue personnel have no general common law or statutory duty to render aid to members of the public, and therefore a city is not liable for a failure to provide medical assistance where no special relationship exists.

Issues

Does a city have a common law duty to render medical aid to a person in distress absent a special relationship?
Does Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 impose a mandatory duty on emergency personnel to render assistance whenever summoned?

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“As a general rule, one has no duty to come to the aid of another.”

“The City’s paramedics had no general duty to render aid to plaintiffs’ decedent.”

“The clear import of this language is to limit, not expand, a public entity’s liability exposure for providing emergency services to the public.”

Opinion

COMPTON, Acting P. J.

Plaintiffs Manuel and Rosa Zepeda appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to their complaint. We affirm.

The record reveals that plaintiffs commenced an action against defendants City of Los Angeles (City) and Robert Rosito1 for the wrongful death of their son Jerman. According to the allegations of the complaint, Rosito shot Jerman in the neck on February 28, 1988. Even though they were in no apparent danger, a paramedic team employed by the City purportedly refused to render medical attention or otherwise assist Jerman until the police arrived at the scene. The complaint further averred that Jerman eventually died because the paramedics breached “a duty to come to the aid of the decedent or at least make inquiry as to the status of the decedent.”

The City subsequently filed a demurrer which the trial court sustained with leave to amend. When plaintiffs elected to stand on their complaint, the court again sustained the demurrer and then dismissed the action.

Even assuming, as we must, that all of the material facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint are true (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1076-1077 [195 Cal.Rptr. 576]), we find they have failed to state a cause of action against the City for wrongful death.

The sine qua non of any negligence action is, of course, the existence of a duty of care owed by the alleged wrongdoer to the person injured, or to a class of which he is a member. (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 399 [115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669]; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; Gregori[235]an v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 944, 948 [220 Cal.Rptr. 302].) As used here, the term “duty” is simply “an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 53, p. 358; see also Sullivan v. City of Sacramento (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1075 [235 Cal.Rptr. 844].) Whether or not a duty exists is primarily a question of law. (Sullivan at p. 1075; Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614, 619 [146 Cal.Rptr. 535, 17 A.L.R.4th 1118].)

Zepeda v. City of Los Angeles

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