City of Redwood v. Dalton Construction Co.

Opinion

CHANNELL, J. In 1983, appellant Dalton Construction Company contracted with San Mateo County to construct a public utility as part of the [1572]county’s wastewater management plan. In 1984, Dalton, a licensed contractor, obtained a permit from respondent City of Redwood City to haul “ ‘earth materials’ ” under this contract and paid $2,475 in fees pursuant to its hauling ordinance. Dalton’s later request for a refund was refused by the city.

Pursuant to its county contract, Dalton transported “ ‘earth materials’ ” over the city’s streets to a site in an unincorporated area on the outskirts of the city. It necessarily used vehicles with gross weights over three tons in order to complete this task. In June 1984, one of Dalton’s drivers was cited for violating the city’s earth hauling ordinance. Ultimately, the driver was acquitted of these charges.

In 1985, the city filed an action against Dalton to collect additional fees. In 1988, an arbitrator denied the city’s claim. The city rejected the decision. In September 1988, the trial court awarded the city $8,500 in additional fees that it sought. Dalton appeals, contending that it is exempt from the city’s hauling ordinance and that the criminal court determination that its driver was not guilty of violating the city’s hauling ordinance required the civil court to find the ordinance was illegal under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We affirm the judgment.

I. Exemption

First, Dalton argues that state law exempts it from application of the city’s hauling ordinance. A city may generally prohibit use of a street by a vehicle exceeding a maximum gross weight limit. (Veh. Code, § 35701, subd. (a); see Ratkovich v. City of San Bruno (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 870, 877, 884 [54 Cal.Rptr. 333].)1 However, section 35704 creates an exception to this general authority by stating: “No ordinance adopted pursuant to Section 35701 to decrease weight limits shall apply to any vehicle owned by a public utility or a licensed contractor while necessarily in use in the construction, installation, or repair of any public utility.” On appeal, the parties agree that Dalton was a licensed contractor operating a vehicle necessarily in use to construct a public utility, but disagree about whether section 35704 applies. The trial court found that the city’s fee was a regulation, not a prohibition of use of its streets by vehicles over a certain weight limit which would have been precluded by section 35704. Therefore, it concluded, section 35704 did not apply and Dalton was required to pay the city fee.