City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

Opinion

FUKUTO, J. J.—In this mandamus proceeding, two defendants seek a writ to compel the superior court to sustain their demurrer, based on the statute of limitations.

According to the allegations of the first amended complaint, which we of course accept as true at this stage, plaintiff was detained and strip-searched at the Los Angeles International Airport by employees of the United States Customs Service on March 1, 1982. Plaintiff was then taken into custody by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department, which made further successive body searches at its airport substation, the Venice Division headquarters, the Municipal Court in Culver City, and the Los Angeles County Jail. Plaintiff alleges each of these searches was conducted pursuant to official policies and practices of the City of Los Angeles, was unjustified and unnecessary, and violated his constitutional rights. Named as defendants are the City of Los Angeles (City) and Robert Poteete, whom the complaint identifies as an officer of the Los Angeles Police Department.

Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 28, 1986, just short of four years after the events of which he complains. After a delay of an additional three years, on February 8, 1989, plaintiff served the complaint on the City.

[445]The defendants demurred, arguing plaintiff’s claim is barred by either the one-year statute of limitations for invasion of privacy actions or the three-year statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983. (See Gibson v. United States (9th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2d 1334, 1338-1339; Briley v. State of California (9th Cir. 1977) 564 F.2d 849, 854-855.)

In opposition, plaintiff argued his action arises under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; is brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971) 403 U.S. 388 [29 L.Ed.2d 619, 91 S.Ct. 1999]; and is therefore governed by a four-year limitations period. (See Gibson v. United States, supra, 781 F.2d at p. 1342, applying a four-year limitations period, but suggesting a shorter period may apply.)

The trial court overruled the demurrer, and this petition followed.1

The demurrer should have been sustained, without leave to amend. Bivens held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s command against unreasonable searches and seizures, by a federal agent acting under color of federal authority, gave rise to a claim for damages. Nothing in that decision suggests its holding extends to claims arising from the acts of agents of the states. (See Molina v. Richardson (9th Cir. 1978) 578 F.2d 846, cert. den. 439 U.S. 1048 [58 L.Ed.2d 707, 99 S.Ct. 724]; see generally Annot. (1980) 64 L.Ed.2d 872, §§ 2[a], 9, 10.)