People v. Gapelu

Opinion

HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J. A jury convicted Jerome Gapelu of vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(3)), driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and driving with an alcohol blood count of 0.10 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)). He was granted probation and appeals, claiming the People failed to establish prima facie proof he committed the offenses, independent of his admissions. We disagree and affirm.

Facts

A silver station wagon hit, from behind, a blue truck which was stopped in the road and was signaling to make a left-hand turn. As a result of the collision, the truck was pushed into an oncoming van. The driver of the truck was killed and the driver and passengers in the van were injured, as was the owner of the station wagon, Gapelu.

Discussion

People v. Moreno (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1179 [233 Cal. Rptr. 863], a Fifth Appellate District opinion, is the only published Court of Appeal [1008]decision we or the parties have discovered which addresses the requirement of a prima facie showing of driving under the influence for purposes of admitting a defendant’s statements. Discussing, first, two previous decisions on the matter which involved drivers who were accompanied by passengers of driving age, the Moreno court held: “Under the rationale of the cases discussed above, . . . the prosecution could meet its burden of establishing the corpus delicti of driving under the influence by eliminating those other persons present at the scene from the class of possible drivers. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. A bystander can, of course, testify[1] and deny having driven the vehicle at the time of the offense .... Physical evidence collected from the vehicle, such as fingerprints, could be introduced to show that no one other than defendant had been driving. . . . [O]nce other possible drivers have been eliminated from consideration, a suspect’s proximity to [the] vehicle ... is evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the suspect was the driver. Obviously, the nearer the suspect is to the vehicle, . . . the stronger the inference of driving . . . .” (Id., at p. 1190; italics added.)

Assuming, arguendo, that we agree with the holding of Moreno, we are persuaded that the People here established a sufficient prima facie showing that Gapelu was the driver of the silver station wagon.