Kearns v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal Oct 3, 1988 No. No. B035023Published

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that a physician who provides intraoperative assistance for an unforeseen complication without a preexisting duty of care to the patient qualifies for immunity under the Good Samaritan statutes. Consequently, the court granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to grant the physician's motion for summary judgment.

Issues

Whether an emergency existed within the meaning of the Good Samaritan statutes when a physician provided intraoperative assistance for unexpected surgical complications.
Whether the Good Samaritan statutes apply to emergency medical care rendered within a hospital setting.
Whether a physician who has no preexisting duty of care to a patient is entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan statutes when responding to a request for assistance.

Disposition. remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Where, as here, unexpected complications during surgery produce a pressing necessity requiring immediate intraoperative assistance during a crucial stage of the operation, an emergency exists.”

“Absent a duty of professional care preexisting the emergency, the Good Samaritan law is applicable to protect a physician who renders emergency assistance in a hospital to the patient of another doctor.”

[1327]Opinion

THE COURT.* Walter Kearns, M.D., one of the defendants in a medical malpractice action, is petitioning for a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to enter an order granting summary judgment and/or summary adjudication of issues as to whether a medical emergency existed when he responded to a request for intraoperative assistance in an unexpectedly difficult surgical procedure. Given the conditions under which Kearns rendered medical assistance, we conclude that it is not reasonably inferable that an emergency did not exist and grant the writ insofar as the respondent court’s order denying Kearns’s motion is based on a finding that a triable issue exists as to the existence of an emergency.

Discussion-

In November 1984, Malverse Martin, M.D., a codefendant in this action but not a party to this writ proceeding, performed surgery upon plaintiff Von Rader to remove a malignant ovarian tumor. During surgery, Martin determined he could not remove the tumor without additional assistance and requested the assistance of Kearns in order to complete the surgery. It is undisputed that Kearns had never treated, diagnosed, consulted or in any matter participated in the treatment and care of plaintiff prior to the request to render intraoperative assistance. Sometime during the surgery, the malignant contents of the tumor spilled into plaintiff’s abdomen, seeding the abdomen with cancer cells.

Plaintiff then filed this medical malpractice action, naming Kearns as one of the defendants. By means of a motion for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication of issues, Kearns sought the protection of the Good Samaritan law codified in Business and Professions Code sections 2395 and 2396.1

Section 2395 provides: “No licensee, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care. . .

Section 2396 provides: “No licensee, who in good faith upon the request of another person so licensed, renders emergency medical care to a person for medical complication arising from prior care by another person so licensed, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or [1328]

Kearns v. Superior Court

AI Brief

More from California Court of Appeal

Related research

AI Brief