People v. Dependable Insurance

Opinion

ORTEGA, J. Introduction

In an attempt to persuade this court to reverse an order of the superior court denying its motion to vacate a bail forfeiture and exonerate bond, defendant and appellant Dependable Insurance Company (appellant) has filed an opening brief claiming the nonexistence of a minute order which clearly appears in the clerk’s transcript. Appellant has failed to include the reporter’s transcript of the relevant hearing in its designation of the record on appeal. Notified that this court is considering sanctions for the filing of a [873]frivolous appeal, counsel has adopted a new position, as devoid of merit as the original.

Facts

Larry Craig (Craig), defendant in a criminal case, was in Department South J of the superior court on July 30, 1986. The matter was continued to August 4, 1986, and Craig was ordered to return. On August 4, 1986, as shown by the minute order appellant chooses to characterize as a “clerk’s note,” the matter was trailed to August 6, 1986, with Craig ordered to return.

That minute order contains errors. For example, a note in the caption states “Parties and counsel checked if present.” Nothing is checked. Nonetheless, it is evident from the entire document that Craig was present with counsel and ordered to return to Department South J.

A Department J minute order dated August 6, 1986, shows the matter transferred to Department South E. This time there are check marks next to the names of the deputy district attorney and defense counsel. There is nothing to indicate the presence of Craig.

Another minute order dated August 6, 1986, shows the judge in Department E forfeiting the $20,000 bail and issuing a bench warrant for Craig’s arrest.

On March 16, 1987, appellant’s motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond was denied.

Contentions

Appellant’s sole contention in his opening brief is that since nothing shows that Craig was, on August 4, ordered to appear on August 6, the order of the latter date forfeiting bail was a nullity because the court lacked the authority to issue it inasmuch as Craig was not scheduled to appear on August 6. At the hearing on the “Order to Show Cause re Sanctions,”1 counsel abandoned that position and instead relied on the position taken in his brief filed in opposition to the order to show cause; i.e., that since there is nothing to indicate that Craig was present in Department J on August 6 when the matter was transferred to Department E, bail should have been