San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Martha G.

Opinion

WIENER, Acting P. J. When Sophia Rachel B. was born on August 13, 1985, her mother Martha G. had been subject to an LPS conservatorship for the better part of seven years suffering from a mental disorder. The county’s public guardian served as Martha’s conservator. Approximately two months after Sophia’s birth, she was made a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a) and placed with a friend of Martha’s who hoped to adopt her. At that time, Martha was diagnosed as suffering from Bipolar Affective Disorder with “zero prognosis regarding any future hope of being able to care for and manage needs of an infant.”

During the next year and a half, Martha alternated between staying in psychiatric hospitals and board-and-care facilities. Two attempts at independent living proved unsuccessful. In December 1986, the county’s department of social services (DSS) petitioned to have Sophia declared free from her mother’s custody and control pursuant to Civil Code section 232.

A guardian ad litem and an attorney were appointed to represent Martha in the section 232 proceeding. The county counsel represented the DSS. Before the hearing on the petition, the guardian moved to have county counsel disqualified on the ground that because the office represented both the DSS and the public guardian (Martha’s conservator), a conflict of interest was present which precluded its further involvement in the case. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that county counsel had never previously represented Martha and that there was no showing county counsel had ever received any confidential information about Martha in the course of its representation of the public guardian. Martha did not seek pretrial review of the order denying her motion. Thereafter, the court sustained the Civil Code section 232 petition and entered a judgment accordingly.

Discussion

Martha has appealed from the judgment declaring Sophia free of her custody and control. She does not challenge the substance of that judgment [1439]except to the extent it incorporates the pretrial order denying her motion to disqualify county counsel from representing the DSS. We are initially confronted with the question of what standard of review to apply to such an appeal. More specifically, where a party does not seek pretrial review of an order refusing to disqualify opposing counsel and raises the issue only on appeal from the final judgment in the action, is that party obligated to demonstrate that the denial of the motion in some way affected the outcome of the case? We conclude such a showing is required.