Orange County Department of Social Services v. Dale V.

Opinion

WALLIN, J. A father argues the juvenile court applied the wrong standard of proof at the jurisdictional phase of a child dependency proceeding. We find no error and aifirm.

I

A petition filed May 29, 1986, alleged Jennifer V. was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because she was sexually abused by her father and neglected by her mother. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (d).)1 On July 29, 1986, at the conclusion of a hotly contested jurisdictional hearing, the court found the allegations of the petition true by a preponderance of the evidence.

On August 19 the parties stipulated to a dispositional order declaring Jennifer a dependent child of the juvenile court, vesting custody in the social services director and releasing Jennifer to the care of her paternal uncle and his wife. Jennifer’s father, Dale V., thereafter appealed “from the judgment . . . entered July 29, 1986”—i.e., the jurisdictional order.

II

Preliminarily, the minor’s attorney presents two grounds for dismissal of the appeal. First, she contends the jurisdictional order itself is [1209]nonappealable. Second, she argues Dale V.’s stipulation to the dispositional order bars him from claiming error in the dependency proceedings.

The first argument for dismissal is easily answered. While the jurisdictional order is not an appealable final judgment, any errors in the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings are reviewable on appeal from the dispositional order. (In re Gregory M. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089-1090 [137 Cal.Rptr. 756]; see also In re Kelvin M. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 396, 399 [143 Cal.Rptr. 561].) We construe the notice of appeal as from that final order, recognizing that “[a] notice of appeal shall be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1(a); see also Knodel v. Knodel (1975) 14 Cal.3d 752, 762 [122 Cal.Rptr. 521, 537 P.2d 353].)

The second problem is more nettlesome. Counsel for the minor correctly points out that a party may not appeal from an order or judgment entered pursuant to stipulation. (Lawler v. Bannerman (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 893, 894 [87 Cal.Rptr. 756].) But she fails to establish that stipulation to a dispositional order necessarily implies consent to the antecedent jurisdictional order.2 Nor is that proposition self-evident. The dispositional phase of dependency proceedings is akin to the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings. (See In re Kelvin M., supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 396, 399.) By accepting a sentence of probation, a convicted defendant does not waive the right to appeal the conviction itself. Likewise, a parent should be able to accede to a dispositional order and so facilitate family reunification—a principal goal of the dependency case—without waiving the right to challenge the underlying order establishing court jurisdiction over the child in the first place. Only in the event of an unambiguous stipulation to the jurisdictional findings would we find a waiver of that right. (See In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].)