Greater Irvine Credit Union v. Superior Court
Before: Wallin
Opinion
WALLIN, J. Bonita Kent obtained a loan from the Greater Irvine Credit Union secured by her 1978 Cadillac Seville. The loan went into default and [1191]the credit union repossessed the car. Kent sued the credit union alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion. She claims she was in bankruptcy with a stay order in effect when the car was repossessed and thus the credit union’s initial seizure of the car and subsequent refusal to return it to her were wrongful. The credit union alleges that Kent was in default and repossession was proper under the loan agreement and that she did not notify it of her bankruptcy prior to the repossession.
The credit union brought a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for summary adjudication of issues, which was denied. In its minute order, the court stated, “There are triable issues of material [fact] as to whether defendants breached their duty to plaintiff, whether defendants were justified in depriving plaintiff of her property and whether defendants caused a delay in returning plaintiff’s property by refusal to reinstate the loan. Declaration of plaintiff and deposition testimony. Defendants have not sustained their burden that there is no triable issue of material fact as to damages.”
The credit union petitioned this court for a writ of mandate, contending the trial court failed to specify those issues presenting a material, triable controversy and to refer to the evidence in conflict as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c.1 Without reaching the merits of the credit union’s motion, we find the court’s order does not meet the requirements of section 437c and grant the writ.
Section 437c, subdivisions (f) and (g), provide that the court’s order after a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for summary adjudication of issues shall specify those issues that are without substantial controversy and shall specify those material facts and issues raised by the motion as to which there exists a material, triable controversy. The order shall refer to the conflicting evidence regarding each of the triable issues. “By requiring the court to specify one or more material facts in controversy and to specifically refer to the evidence proffered in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Legislature has forced the court to focus its attention upon where the legal issues leave off and the factual issues begin. ... [¶] The value of subdivision (g) is that it encourages the parties and the court to analyze the law before reaching the conclusion that disputed factual issues exist. In the course of identifying the disputed facts and specifying the conflicting evidence, the court may discover, for example,
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