Ritchie v. Superior Court

Opinion

ANDERSON, J. This is an appeal from the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s application for a name change.

Petitioner Thomas Boyd Ritchie III (appellant) filed an application to change his name as a matter of public record (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 1275 et [1072]seq.) to the roman numeral “HI” (pronounced Three). The application stated in essence that appellant was born Thomas Boyd Ritchie III. Approximately six years prior to the filing of the application appellant began to use HI as his name primarily for the sake of convenience. Thereafter, he kept using the new name because it gave him a greater sense of personal identity and his friends, peers and business associates knew him by that name. Appellant finally alleged that an official recordation of his new name was essential in order to obtain crucial documents (driver’s license, credit cards, etc.) from agencies and financial institutions.

After hearing the trial court denied the application on the grounds that a change to a roman numeral did not constitute a name change within the meaning of the law and that the new “name” used by appellant was inherently confusing.

Appellant contends that the denial of his petition was an abuse of discretion. We disagree with appellant and affirm the order.

The common law recognizes the right of a person to change his name without the necessity of legal proceedings; the purpose of the statutory procedure is simply to have, wherever possible, the change recorded. (In re Ross (1937) 8 Cal.2d 608, 609 [67 P.2d 94, 110 A.L.R. 217]; Weathers v. Superior Court (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 286, 288 [126 Cal.Rptr. 547].) While California case law seems to favor the legal change of a name to conform to usage, and while these cases uniformly teach us that there must be a substantial reason for the denial, they nonetheless recognize that the statute does vest the trial court with discretion in granting or denying an application for a name change. (§ 12782; In re McGehee (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 25, 26 [304 P.2d 167]; In re Useldinger (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 723, 727 [96 P.2d 958].) While it has been said that the trial court may properly deny the application if the name was adopted to defraud, intentionally confuse or intrude into someone’s privacy (Weathers v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 288-289), it is well settled that each case must be decided on its own facts, and that in adjudicating the issue additional reasons may also be considered. (In re Weingand (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 289, 293 [41 Cal.Rptr. 778]; In re Useldinger, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d at p. 727.) Lastly, it is blackletter law that the exercise of the trial court’s discretion will be disturbed only for a clear abuse (Weeks v. Roberts (1968) 68 Cal.2d 802, 806 [69 Cal.Rptr. 305, 442 P.2d 361]), and that if there is any basis upon which the action can be sustained, the ruling of the trial court must be