People v. Anthony H.

[1125]Opinion

WOODMANSEE, J.* After an adjudication upon a petition alleging commission of murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and firearm use, in a drive-by shooting, the minor was committed to the Department of Youth Authority for the maximum period allowable in the juvenile court proceeding.

Appellant contends his confession was improperly received in evidence. We agree. The error is prejudicial per se. (In re Joe R. (1980) 'll Cal.3d 496, 512 [165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927].)

In the juvenile master calendar court, before Judge Todd, appellant’s counsel requested that a judge, other than the trial judge, hear the objection to the introduction in evidence of the minor’s confession. The district attorney and the judge agreed to the procedure.1 (This was not a Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1 search and seizure motion to suppress evidence illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.)

A full adversary hearing was conducted by Judge Disco. She made a decision as to the credibility of witnesses, and, based on substantial evidence, found the confession inadmissible because it was involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. As scheduled, the case then went to Judge Altman for trial. There, for the first time, the district attorney stated an intention to relitigate the evidentiary question just decided by Judge Disco. Judge Altman transferred the matter to the master calendar judge for her determination of the posture of the case.

The Attorney General concedes (and, having read the transcript on appeal, we agree) that the district attorney and the master calendar trial judge initially understood that Judge Disco’s decision would be binding.

The decisive question is whether the words and other conduct of the district attorney, were, under all of the circumstances, tantamount to a binding stipulation.2 We find that they were. All of the partic[1126]ipants contemplated that Judge Disco’s decision would be dispositive of the confession issue. There was a mutual understanding that the result of the hearing was to be binding for all purposes.