People v. George

Opinion

SMITH, J. Defendant Diane Youngblood George appeals from a judgment sentencing her to a nine-year term in state prison1 based on a jury verdict finding her guilty of robbery with personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 211 and 12022.5)2 and on her admission of two alleged prior terms served for felony offenses (§ 677.5, subd. (b)).

I. Defendant has not shown prejudice flowing from any denial of her speedy trial rights.

For her first contention, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss, brought on the ground that she was denied a speedy trial under section 1381.53 and under article I, section 15, of our state Constitution.4

[959]The first charges against defendant arising out of the Richmond bank robbery were filed in Contra Costa County Bay Judicial District municipal court in a complaint dated January 14, 1981.5 Defendant was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona, on January 20 and transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in San Diego on the following day on a probation violation. A detainer was lodged with the MCC on January 22nd. On January 29, 1981, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California revoked defendant’s probation and committed her to a six-month sentence.

Defendant claims to have made speedy trial requests between January 24 and 27, 1981, but the first request acknowledged by state authorities was a letter dated April 29 and received by the Contra Costa District Attorney’s Office on May 11, 1981.

During the period from February 18 to June 26, 1981, defendant was being prosecuted in San Diego County Superior Court on another robbery charge.

On July 23, 1981, the District Attorney’s Office obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. On July 31st, federal authorities offered to deliver temporary custody, and the offer was accepted on August 5th. After her delivery to Contra Costa County, defendant, on October 1, 1981, was arraigned. Trial was set for October 26th, but defendant subsequently waived time for trial. Trial began on December 1, 1981.

On October 29, 1981, defendant moved pursuant to sections 1381.5 and 1387 to dismiss the information based on asserted denial of her speedy trial rights. In its minute order decision denying the motion, the court indicated that defendant had not satisfactorily established that speedy trial requests were made prior to the one made on May 11, 1981, and that the People had “abundantly established good cause to wait from May 11, 1981, until the defendant’s case in San Diego County had been concluded.” On appeal, defendant challenges the court’s factual finding that no request was established and its determination that good cause had been established for delay. (See People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 570 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738] [“What constitutes good cause for the delay of a criminal trial is a matter that lies within the discretion of the trial court”].)