General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court

Opinion

SCOTT, J. This petition by General Motors Corporation for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 400) challenges a trial court ruling denying change of venue. It raises issues concerning where a class action may be brought and what showing must be made by a defendant seeking to change venue. We have concluded that venue in Alameda County is not proper and that the writ should issue.

The complaint, filed in Alameda County Superior Court by real party in interest John Junglas, alleges defects in the 1981 Cadillac V-8-6-4 engine causing unexpected surges, delays, and cessations of power. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs suing General Motors Corporation, Rector Cadillac, and various Doe defendants for defects in design, manufacturing, and servicing, for breach of implied and express warranties, and for misrepresentations.

After service and before answering the complaint, General Motors Corporation moved for a change of venue to Los Angeles County, asserting that neither General Motors nor Rector Cadillac, a San Mateo County dealership, had its principal place of business in Alameda County, and that the contracts were not made, to be performed, or breached in Alameda County.1 Thereafter, plaintiff amended the complaint and served Lew Doty Cadillac of Hayward, Alameda [969]County, as a Doe defendant. In opposing the motion to change venue, plaintiff argued that the amendment made venue correct. Plaintiff also contended that General Motors had not established that its principal place of business was in Los Angeles. After hearing, the court denied General Motors’ motion to change venue. This petition followed.

Petitioner contends that the amendment to name Lew Doty Cadillac does not justify venue in Alameda County because (1) Lew Doty was named in order to defeat the motion to change venue, and (2) the named plaintiff has no cause of action against Lew Doty. Real party counters that petitioner had the burden of establishing that venue in Alameda County was improper and that petitioner failed to prove (1) that the named plaintiff had not purchased a car from Lew Doty, had one serviced there, or relied on Lew Doty advertising, and (2) that General Motors Corporation’s principal place of business was somewhere other than Alameda County at the time of the suit.

We need not consider real party’s motives for serving Lew Doty, because we agree with petitioner that unless the named plaintiff has a cause of action against Lew Doty Cadillac, venue in Alameda County cannot be based upon service of Lew Doty as a Doe defendant. As stated in Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 193 [112 Cal.Rptr. 144]; “A predicate to a plaintiff’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right; what he may not achieve himself, he may not accomplish as a representative of a class. ” (Id., at p. 201.) Unless real party has a personal cause of action against Lew Doty Cadillac, he may not represent a class in a suit against Lew Doty. If real party cannot maintain an action against Lew Doty, it follows a fortiori that he cannot justify venue because of Lew Doty.