Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. City of Los Angeles
Before: Kingsley
Opinion
KINGSLEY, Acting P. J. This is an appeal from a judgment on a cross-complaint, requiring appellant to indemnify respondent city for a judgment rendered in an action for personal injuries. We affirm.
In 1975 a man named Svorinich, employed by appellant, was injured while operating a forklift on a wharf owned by the city and then used by appellant. That action resulted in a substantial judgment in favor of Svorinich against the city, against which appellant was allowed a share for the workers’ compensation benefits paid to Svorinich. The city cross-complained against appellant, contending that, under the terms of appellant’s use of the wharf, it was obligated to hold the city harmless even for the city’s own negligence. The trial court agreed with the city and gave judgment in its favor from which appellant has appealed; we affirm.
Appellant is a regular user of the city’s wharf in its business of loading and unloading cargo. It has entered into an agreement with the city [982]expressly providing for the indemnity herein involved. The contentions here made are: (1) that the agreement between the city and appellant did not apply to the use of the wharf herein involved; (2) that the indemnity provision violated section 905 of the Longshoremens’ and Harbor Workers’ Act as amended in 1972 (33 U.S.C.A. § 905); and (3) that the indemnity provision also violates section 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916 (46 U.S.C.A. § 816.) We reject all three contentions.
I
The wharf herein involved was assigned to another stevedore, but was used by appellant in this instance with the permission of the assignee and with the knowledge of the city. Appellant’s claim is that its agreement with the city applied only to the wharfs directly assigned to it. The trial court rejected that contention, as do we. The agreement between appellant and the city contained the following provision:
“(e) The conditions, operations, use, occupation, acts, omissions or negligence referred to in (a), (b) and (c) above, existing or conducted by the assignee, its agents, officers, employees, licensees, permittees or invitees, of any other premises within the Harbor District, as defined in the Charter of said City, and which premises are used or occupied by the assignee, its agents, officers, employees, licensees, permittees or invitees, without the express written authorization of the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the General Manager.
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