People v. Julio A.

Opinion

ROTH, P. J. Julio A.was found to be a minor violating laws defining crime (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) in that he took a vehicle without consent of its owner (Veh. Code, § 10851). He appeals from the order of wardship, contending: “Once in custody of the probation officer, a minor child should not be transferred to a police agency. Any statement as a result of such transfer should be suppressed.”

On September 18, 1979, Louis Lima reported to the police that his 1966 Chevrolet Impala had been taken without his consent. Four days [885]later Laverne Police Officer Larry Leffingwell saw appellant tampering with the rear license plate of Lima’s Chevrolet, which was parked with its engine running. The officer was advised by police radio that the car had been stolen and appellant was placed under arrest.

At the Laverne police station appellant was advised of, and waived, his constitutional rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]). However, no interview took place. Appellant, at this time, identified himself as “Jose Ramos.” In accordance with standard procedure, he was transferred to the custody of the county sheriff.

On September 26, 1979, Deputy Sheriffs Victor Fernandez and Robert Olson interviewed appellant at juvenile hall in the presence of a probation officer. After readvisement and waiver of his constitutional rights, appellant said that his name was not “Ramos,” denied that his name was Julio A., and asserted that his true name was “Angel Velasquez.” The juvenile hall authorities then released him to the custody of the probation officer, who in turn released him to the custody of the deputy sheriffs.

The deputies took appellant to the sheriff station and booked him for taking Lima’s car under the name Julio A. When shown certain police records, appellant finally admitted that his true name was Julio A. After a third readvisement and waiver of his rights, appellant admitted that he stole the Chevrolet by punching its ignition.

Preliminarily, we note that appellant questions neither the voluntariness of his confession nor the adequacy of the Miranda admonitions preceding it. Rather, he contends that it should be suppressed because the probation officer abused his discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 626 in relinquishing custody of him to the deputy sheriffs, thereby tainting his subsequent confession.1