In re Morales

Opinion

BROWN (Gerald), P. J. Ralph Morales petitions for immediate release, alleging he is unconstitutionally confined in the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) for a longer period than the determinate sentence for the underlying criminal offense.

On January 15, 1975, when Morales was convicted of illegally possessing a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021), the offense was punishable either as a felony with a maximum term of 15 years in prison or as a misdemeanor in county jail.1 Sentence was not imposed; Morales was civilly committed as a narcotic addict to the CRC. The maximum term of commitment for a narcotic addict when Morales was committed was seven years. However, by legislative amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201 (eff. July 29, 1980) the term of a CRC commitment for those who commit crimes after its effective date is limited to the determinate sentence for the underlying offense. (Stats. 1980, ch. 822, § 8, p. 2588.) That amendment expressly applies prospectively only. (Id. § 9.)

Because Morales has never been sentenced for his offense, we do not know whether (1) his offense would be treated as a felony or a misdemeanor, (2) the court would impose a 15-year term or something less, and (3) the Board of Prison Terms, in recomputing his sentence under the determinate sentence law, would treat him as a serious offender or impose the determinate sentence now prescribed for his offense.

The People say the writ petition is moot and should be dismissed because on October 16, 1980, the superior court vacated Morales’ civil addict commitment and remanded him for sentencing on the underlying [460]criminal offense. The superior court released him from custody and the Board of Prison Terms is now considering whether a serious offender hearing (Pen. Code, § 1170.2, subd. (b)) should be held. Because, however, we have fully considered the important issue of the constitutionality of the prospective application of the 1980 amendment which will affect many inmates of CRC, we proceed to decide the case (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23 [89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737]).

Morales questions the constitutionality of the prospective application of the 1980 amendment which limits CRC commitments to the underlying sentences. He contends it denies equal protection of the laws to base disparate treatment of offenders solely on the date of incarceration (In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, 548 [114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 522 P.2d 657]; In re Thomson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 950, 955 [164 Cal.Rptr. 99]). Such fact alone is ap insufficient basis to treat prisoners differently. Here, however, other differences exist. It has been pointed out there are rational reasons to treat narcotics addicts committed to CRC differently from other kinds of institutionalized persons such as MDSO patients or persons incompetent to stand trial. Narcotics addict commitment is an alternative to criminal sanctions. Its objective is treatment and rehabilitation as well as to protect the public. It has been demonstrated such treatment and rehabilitation requires long confinement. (See People v. Gray (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 18 [139 Cal.Rptr. 805]; In re Werden (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 79 [142 Cal.Rptr. 622].) Both People v. Gray and In re Werden, supra, have held there is compelling justification, for the reasons stated, to treat narcotics addict commitments differently than persons who have committed the same underlying offenses but who are not addicts. (Cf., People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236 [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375] (youth authority); People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338 [121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373] (mentally disordered sex offender); In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457 [149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097] (incompetents).)