People v. Grow

Opinion

CHRISTIAN, J. Gordon Grow, William Girolomoni and Pamela Bareford have appealed from orders by which they were admitted to probation after a jury found each of them guilty of one count of pandering (Pen. Code, § 266i) and one count of pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h). The verdicts are well supported by evidence that appellant Grow was the owner, and with appellants Girolomoni and Bareford was involved in the management and operation of a so-called “encounter studio” in which, for money, male customers were orally copulated or masturbated by female employees. Crucial to the prosecution’s case was the testimony of Margo Compton concerning the details of the operation. The verdicts of pandering and pimping related to her acts, as to which there was direct or circumstantial evidence that each of the appellants participated in arranging and sponsoring.

Appellant Bareford contends that it was a denial of due process and of equal protection to fail to provide a postindictment preliminary hearing. The contention must be rejected as contrary to controlling authority. (People v. Superior Court (Persons) (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 191 [128 Cal.Rptr. 314].)

It is contended that the prosecutor should have disclosed to the grand jury the fact that the witness, Margo Compton, was a drug user and that she was an accomplice who had been granted immunity in exchange for her testimony. But the record does not show that Margo Compton actually received immunity; on the contrary, the prosecutor represented to the court that an offer of immunity had been declined with a statement to the effect, “I want to tell my story and I am not worried about the rest of that.” No plausible theory has been advanced as to how that circumstance could have been viewed as exculpatory under Johnson v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 248 [124 Cal.Rptr. 32, 539 P.2d 792]. Margo Compton did testify at trial that she had been using “speed” while [313]working at the encounter parlor. The record supports the determination of the trial court that at the time of the presentation before the grand juiy, the prosecutor did not have information that Margo Compton had been taking “speed.” Similarly, there is no indication that exculpatory information was withheld in regard to Margo Compton’s claimed status as an accomplice. As a matter of law, she was not an accomplice to the charged offenses. (People v. Frey (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 33, 52 [39 Cal.Rptr. 49].) Moreover, her involvement in the activities at the encounter parlor was fully disclosed in her own testimony before the grand jury.