People v. Cheatham

Opinion

BROWN (G. A.), P. J. This appeal is from a judgment of conviction of escape while charged with a felony. (Pen. Code, § 4532, subd. (b).)

At the time of his escape, appellant had been formally charged with violations of Penal Code sections 593 and 484 (interference with electrical transmission lines and theft, respectively) by a complaint theretofore filed in a justice court and was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued on those charges. While he was in custody of an officer, and before he was booked, jailed or convicted, he escaped. The principal issue in this case is whether appellant can be legally convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 4532, subdivision (b), which in pertinent part provides: “Every prisoner arrested and booked for, charged with, or convicted of a felony who is confined in any county or city jail or prison or industrial farm or industrial road camp or who is engaged on any county road or other county work or who is in the lawful custody of any officer ... who escapes or attempts to escape ... is guilty of a felony... .” Appellant contends that his departure from the custody of the officer is not proscribed by the statute. (People v. Harris (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 754, 758 [12 Cal.Rptr. 916].)

It is fundamental that in construing a statute the court “should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672].) In ascertaining the will of the Legislature, “the court turns first to the words themselves for the answer,” and “[i]f the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute .. .” [595](People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183 [217 P.2d 1]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1858; In re Miller (1947) 31 Cal.2d 191, 198-199 [187 P.2d 722]; Skivers v. State of California (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 652, 655 [91 Cal.Rptr. 707].) In giving effect to this canon of literal construction, statutes must be interpreted “according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them” (In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 737 [265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 1500]; see also Chavez v. Sargent (1959) 52 Cal.2d 162, 203 [339 P.2d 801] (overruled on other grounds in Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, etc., Local No. 88 (1960) 53 Cal.2d 455, 475 [2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76])), and “[whenever possible, effect should be given to the statute as a whole, and to its every word and clause, so that no part or provision will be useless or meaningless. ... It will be presumed that every word, phrase, and provision was intended to have some meaning and perform some useful office, and a construction implying that words were used in vain, or that they are surplusage, will be avoided.” (45 Cal.Jur.2d. Statutes, § 117. pp. 626-627; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1858; People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 645.)