Hughes v. County of San Diego

Opinion

BROWN (Gerald), P. J. Michael Lewis Hughes, plaintiff, appeals a following an order granting defendant County of San Diego’s motion for nonsuit during a jury trial.

The record on appeal consists of the trial court’s order and this settled statement of facts:

“(H)ughes . . . sustained injuries on . . . July 3, 1968, while a prisoner in San Diego County Jail. [He] was burned by a fire of incendiary origin. Other prisoners ignited certain polyurethane mattress inserts provided as part of the bedding in the cell occupied by [him].

“[Hughes] brought this action against . . . [the] County of San Diego, the Sheriff of San Diego County, and fictitiously named defendants. The action against the Sheriff and the fictitiously named defendants has been dismissed.

“Evidence was produced at the trial sufficient to sustain a finding that the mattress inserts provided were unusually flammable and would not have been used in a properly operated jail.

[351]“A judgment of non-suit was ordered ... the Court finding [Hughes] was a prisoner ... at the time of the accident and . . . [the] County of San Diego was immune from liability by reason of Government Code of the State of California, and in particular § 844.6. . . .”

Government Code section 844.6 provides: “(a) [A] public entity is not liable for: (1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner. (2) An injury to any prisoner.

“(d) Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission. ...”

Hughes contends Government Code section 844.6 is unconstitutional, denying him equal protection of the law. He argues the section irrationally distinguishes prisoners from non-prisoners.

Section 844.6 provides public entities with two immunities. The first is immunity to an action for damages proximately caused by a prisoner. The second is immunity in actions for injury where the plaintiff is a prisoner. The first immunity does not necessarily apply in this case. The prisoners’ acts of setting fire to the mattress were a cause of the injuries, but proximate causation involves other factors, and there has been no determination Hughes’ injuries were proximately caused by prisoners. The second immunity, on the other hand, does apply, since Hughes was a prisoner when injured. The issue here is the constitutionality of the second immunity.