People v. Donovan

Opinion

KINGSLEY, J. Defendant was charged with possession of heroin, in violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code; one prior felony conviction was also alleged. He pled not guilty and denied the prior. After a jury trial, he was found guilty and the prior was found to be true. On October 25, 1967, motion for a new trial was made and denied; criminal [923]proceedings were suspended and proceedings were instituted under the Narcotics Rehabilitation Act, resulting in his commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center under that statute. So far as the record discloses, that order is still in effect and the criminal proceedings are still suspended.

On October 25, 1967, defendant filed an appeal “from (1) the judgment rendered against him and (2) the order denying his motion for a new1 trial made on October 25, 1967, . . .” We dismiss the appeal from the nonexistent judgment; we affirm the order denying a new trial.

Since criminal proceedings were suspended prior to the imposition of sentence, and have not been resumed, there is no judgment from which to appeal; the purported appeal “from the judgment” must be dismissed.1

At the date herein involved, an appeal did he from an order denying a motion for a new trial if that order was followed by a narcotic commitment, as was the case here. But an appeal from an order denying a new trial raises only those contentions expressly made in support of the motion in the trial court. A general motion “on ah statutory grounds,” submitted without argument, does not suffice to raise any issues cognizable on appeal. In People v. Beatcher (1934) 136 Cal.App. 337, 338-339 [28 P.2d 943], Mr. Presiding Justice Conrey said, with reference to an appeal from an order denying a motion so phrased: “But when the defendant appeals from an order denying such motion, it is incumbent upon him to show affirmatively that in the trial court’s consideration of the motion and decision thereon there was some abuse of discretion. The bald statement to the trial court that the defendant made his motion for new trial ‘on all the statutory grounds,’ without argument and without suggestion of any definite reason for granting the motion, did not fairly and reasonably call for decision upon any indicated question in the case. Essentially, it failed to bring to the attention of the court any one reason why a new trial should be granted. The motion was just a general appeal to the world of legal possibilities. Although courts of appeal are created to review and correct errors of trial courts, the law intends (so I believe) that upon a motion for a new trial, the trial court