Hemenway v. C. D. H.

Opinion

CHRISTIAN, J. C. D. H., Jr. appeals from an order of the juvenile court adjudging him to be a minor coming under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, in that appellant violated Penal Code section 245 (assault with a deadly weapon) by shooting Keith Baldy with a .22 rifle.

On the evening of the shooting appellant, the victim Keith Baldy, and other juveniles, were amusing themselves with music, cards, and drink in a trailer house near the village of Hoopa. As the victim was washing his hands, appellant called out his name and then shot him in the back. Appellant had earlier declared his intention of getting a gun and shooting the others. He had been drinking; the victim testified that he therefore did not take this statement as an actual threat. A girl who was present had earlier [233]picked up the rifle, worked the lever, looked into the chamber, and determined that the rifle was then not loaded. Just before the shooting appellant went to a nearby house where the victim’s mother was and told her “that there was some disturbance over there.” She followed appellant back to the trailer and saw the shooting. She testified, “Well, I don’t think it was intentionally, I believe maybe he was bluffing them, as I said; I thought it was a BB gun.”

On appeal it is contended that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that the shooting was other than accidental. We must deal with this contention in the light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068]) that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is requisite to due process at the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile court proceeding. Because the present case is before us on direct review, no question of retrospective application is presented; the Winship rule is applicable. (Cf. Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618, 625-627 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 605-607, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1735-1736].) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurisdictional finding, we are therefore to apply the test applicable to the same issue if presented in a criminal appeal (i.e., a case in which the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof was to be applied by the trier of fact). The appellate court must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jurisdictional allegations of the petition were true. (Cf. People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745 [79 Cal.Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d 321]; People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122 [70 Cal.Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777].) The evidence reviewed above is sufficient to enable a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that beyond a reasonable doubt appellant intentionally shot Keith Baldy. The theory that the shooting was accidental is repelled by the following facts: