S. A. v. Callahan

[243]Opinion

ELKINGTON, J. Appellant S.A. is a minor, now 19 years of age. From three petitions, contemporaneously filed by her in the juvenile court, the following appears. On three occasions, the first on May 24, 1965, she was adjudged by that court to have come under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 601. The conduct which formed the basis of the adjudications was, consecutively, staying away from home overnight, truancy and battery, and possession of narcotics. She alleged that probation granted by court has now terminated and that she “is not serving a sentence for any offense, nor is under charge of commission of any crime, and has since said termination of said probation, lived an honest and upright life, and has conformed to and obeyed the laws of the land.” Each of her petitions prayed “that the finding of guilt be set aside, and that a plea of not guilty be entered, and that the court dismiss this action pursuant to section 1203.4 of the Penal Code.” The requested relief being denied, she appeals from the order denying each of the three petitions.

Her contention is that the provisions of Penal Code section 1203.4 relating to the release from penalties and disabilities of one convicted of crime should apply to her case.1 The supporting argument is that one convicted of crime may promptly upon completion of probation apply for release from the penalties and disabilities of his offense, while she, a lesser noncriminal offender, now released from probation, must under Welfare and Institutions Code section 781, wait until she reaches the age of 21 before she may apply for substantially similar relief.2 This result, [244]she insists, is unreasonable and unfair, inconsistent with due process (see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428]), and a “denial to a minor of a constitutional right of the guaranty afforded by law to an adult.” (See In re Contreras, 109 Cal.App.2d 787, 789-790 [241 P.2d 631].) She points out, as further illustration and support of her contention, that had her offenses been deemed more aggravated, bringing about her commitment to the California Youth Authority, then upon “honorable discharge” from its control she, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1772, would automatically be released from “all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime for which [she] was commited.”3