Brown v. Wagner
Before: Coakley
[314]Opinion
COAKLEY, J. Basically this appeal is from that portion of a judgment denying admission to probate of three pages written in longhand by the decedent. In the interest of brevity and clarity these pages will be referred to as “the codicil.”
The respondents filed a contest in which they objected to the admission of the codicil to probate. They took the position that the will of July 31, 1961, alone, should be admitted. Ann Wagner, appellant herein and a respondent in the will contest, answered, alleging the validity of the codicil and praying its admission to probate.
The contest filed by the respondents objected to admission of the codicil on four separate grounds. However, the thrust of respondents’ evidence was that the codicil lacked testamentary intent. Appellant, Ann Wagner, offered no evidence, relying on the codicil and the will, both of which were introduced in evidence by the contestants.
The court ruled that (1) the codicil was entirely written, dated and signed by the decedent, and (2) the sole question was whether it was executed with testamentary intent. The findings, conclusions and judgment were in accordance with the court’s decision, and were limited to finding that the will was the last will of the decedent and entitled to admission to probate, and that the codicil lacked testamentary intent and was, therefore, not admissible. The respondents herein, contestants below, made no request for findings on any of the issues raised in their contest other than the issue of testamentary intent. They did not file a cross-appeal, Accordingly, the only issue is that raised by the appellant, viz, whether the codicil was executed with testamentary intent. We hold that it was.
We first observe that the provisions of the codicil are unmistakably integrated with the will. Although the codicil does not use the term “will” or “codicil,” the integration is clearly evident by the detailed references in the codicil to page and line numbers of the will, followed by such words as “out,” “remains,” and “add.” When the two documents are laid side by side, and the directions found in the codicil are applied, the respective provisions of the two documents fit intelligibly and smoothly. The trial court inferentially reached the same conclusion when it ruled that testamentary intent was the sole issue.
The doctrine of integration of two or more writings, executed at different times and in different forms, as constituting the will of the decedent is well established. (See Estate of Wunderle, 30 Cal.2d 274 [181 P.2d 874]; Estate of McCarty, 211 Cal.App.2d 23, 27 [27 Cal.Rptr. 94]; Estate of Johnston, 64 Cal.App. 197 [221 P. 382].)
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