White v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
Before: Fourt
FOURT, J. Ralph C. White appeals from a judgment declaring that his insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (hereinafter sometimes called State Farm) is not required either to defend or to satisfy any judgment resulting from an action instituted against appellant as the consequence of an accident which occurred while appellant was driving an automobile not owned by him.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the trial court’s finding that the car he was driving at the time of the accident was ‘1 furnished or available for . . . [his] frequent or regular use” and thus excluded from his insurance coverage.
White was the named insured on a policjr of automobile insurance, including bodily injury and property damage liability, which was issued by State Farm covering two automobiles, a Chevrolet and a Cadillac, owned by White effective for the period from January 13 to July 13, 1966. That policy provided, in part, that "If the named insured is a person or persons, and if during the policy period such named insured owns an automobile covered by this policy and classified as ‘pleasure and business’, such insurance as is afforded by this policy with respect to the owned automobile under: (1) coverages A and B applies to the use of non-owned automobile ...” The insurance policy further defines a "non-[695]owned automobile” as “. . . an automobile . . . not owned by or furnished or available for the frequent or regular use of . . . the named insured. ...” The theory apparently is that if the automobile is “furnished or available for the frequent or regular use” of the insured, it must be specifically covered by an insurance policy in the same or similar manner as his owned automobiles in order for policy coverage to apply so that several persons regularly using the same car may not do so on a single owner’s policy with impunity.
11 Whether or not a vehicle has been subject to a regular or frequent use excluded by the policy is a question of fact dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case. [Citations.]” (Civil Service Emp. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 222 Cal.App.2d 519, 527 [35 Cal.Rptr. 304].) The trial court found that the car appellant was driving at the time of the accident “was being regularly and frequently used by . . . [him] in both business and social activities; . . .” Under the circumstances, it is the exclusive function of the trial court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts and determine the credibility of witnesses, and if its interpretation is reasonable, the reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s determination, nor reweigh the evidence and draw contrary inferences therefrom (Estate of Desmond, 223 Cal. App.2d 211 [35 Cal.Rptr. 737, 1 A.L.R.3d 1043]; Eason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 212 Cal.App.2d 607 [28 Cal.Rptr. 291]), but will view the facts in the manner most favorable to respondent. (Waller v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal.2d 201 [57 Cal.Rptr. 353, 424 P.2d 937]; Lundgren v. Lundgren, 245 Cal.App.2d 582 [54 Cal.Rptr. 30].)
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