People v. Newton

STONE, J. Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of marijuana, two counts of manslaughter, and of driving while intoxicated. The jury found against defendant on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Upon this appeal defendant relies primarily upon the contention the court abused its discretion in denying his request to dismiss counsel the second day of the trial and to proceed in propria persona. His other ground of appeal, that the court violated Penal Code section 654 in sentencing him on separate counts arising out of the same transaction, proves to be without foundation upon examination of the record. The court followed the procedure outlined in People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755-756 [39 Cal.Rptr. 11], and People v. Gomez, 252 Cal.App.2d 844, 859 [60 Cal.Rptr. 881], by suspending execution of sentence on all but one count of those sentences arising out of the same transaction.

Turning to defendant’s contention that he was improperly denied the right of self-representation at the trial, we note that Deputy Public Defender Germino investigated the case and represented defendant at the preliminary hearing and through the first day of trial. At the beginning of the second day, at the request of Germino, the court convened in chambers, out of the presence of the jury. At that time the judge read a letter from defendant1 addressed to Germino, [574]thanking him for the manner in which he investigated the ease and for his efforts and legal services, but asking Germino to withdraw from the case. After a lengthy conference with defendant, defense counsel, and the district attorney, the trial judge denied defendant’s request.

The principles governing the determination the trial court was required to make when defendant requested withdrawal of his counsel are summarized in People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 671-672 [58 Cal.Rptr. 614, 427 P.2d 214], as follows : “Finally, although every defendant in a criminal ease has the constitutional right to represent himself if he so elects [citations], before his waiver of counsel may be accepted the trial court is duty bound to determine his competency to represent himself. (See, e.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 335-337 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420], and cases there cited.) As stated in Johnson (at p. 335), 1 “the court cannot accept a waiver of counsel from anyone accused of a serious public offense without first determining that he ‘ understands the nature of the charge, the elements of the offense, the pleas and defenses which may be available, or the punishments which may be exacted (quoting from In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 313 [240 P.2d 596])’ ” ’ The inquiry into the defendant’s ability to defend himself fulfills a twofold purpose. It serves not only to determine his competence, but also to alert him to the seriousness of the action he contemplates as well as the pitfalls he may expect to encounter.