Sehgal v. Knight

FRIEDMAN, J. In this personal injury action plaintiff appeals from the judgment following a defense jury verdict.

Counsel are to be complimented for presenting this appeal on a well-conceived settled statement. The accident occurred in Marysville about 9 p.m. on June 16, 1963, at or near the signal-controlled intersection of Fifth Street and Highway 99 (E Street). There was evidence that this intersection lies within the central business district. Highway 99 runs north-south and at that point contains six traffic lanes. Plaintiff Sehgal testified that he commenced to walk across Highway 99 from east to west in the north crosswalk, complying with a green traffic light; that halfway across the first three lanes he became conscious of an automobile approaching from his left (south) ; that he commenced to run to avoid the automobile but was struck either within the crosswalk or several feet outside it.

Mrs. Knight, the defendant, testified that she had stopped for a red light at the intersection; that when the light changed to green she proceeded across; that she did not see plaintiff until an instant before the impact when he jumped out in front of her vehicle 20 or 30 feet past the north cross[172]walk; that plaintiff was thrown 12 to 15 feet. Several witnesses observed plaintiff either just before or during the impact. Mr. Peake testified that plaintiff was about 15 feet outside the crosswalk just preceding the impact. Mrs. Goodnight thought that he was about 20 feet outside the crosswalk at that point of time. Mr. Block’s estimate of plaintiff’s distance outside the crosswalk was 75 feet. Two Highway Patrol officers testified that the point of impact was 51 feet from the crosswalk.

Vehicle Code section 21954 requires every pedestrian crossing a roadway outside a marked crosswalk to yield the right of way to vehicles.1 Vehicle Code section 21961 declares: “This chapter [which includes section 21954] does not prevent local authorities from adopting ordinances prohibiting pedestrians from crossing roadways at other than crosswalks. ’ ’

In effect at the time of the accident was Marysville Ordinance Number 678, a section of which declares: “No pedestrian shall cross a roadway other than by a crosswalk in the central traffic district or in any business district. ’ ’

The issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence and his possible “jaywalking” was discussed in the jury arguments of both counsel. Defendant’s counsel called the jury’s attention to the Marysville ordinance and said that it prohibited jaywalking. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Mr. Sehgal had been chased out of the crosswalk by the approach of Mrs. Knight’s automobile; that even if he had started to cross the street outside the crosswalk, this fact would not constitute contributory negligence per se under the Marysville ordinance, because the state Vehicle Code permits street crossing other than in a crosswalk.