People v. Johnson

ROTH, P. J. Appellant was convicted for driving while under the influence of a narcotic (violation of Veh. Code, § 23105). Criminal proceedings were adjourned, a petition was filed pursuant to Penal Code, section 6451 (now Welf. & Inst. Code, § 3051), and the proceedings were transferred to department 95 of the superior court to determine whether appellant was either a narcotic addict or in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics.

Two doctors were appointed in accordance with the applicable sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code to examine appellant and report to the court. On March 9, 1965, following a hearing, the court found appellant to be . . a drug addict within the meaning of Section 6451 Penal Code” and committed appellant to the custody of the Director of Corrections at the California Rehabilitation Center at Corona.

The hearing of March 9 was unopposed. As stated in People v. Bruce, 64 Cal.2d 55, at p. 59 [48 Cal.Rptr. 719, 409 P.2d 943] : “In the vast majority of cases dealing with mentally ill persons, as well as with narcotic addicts, such petitions are unopposed, and the proceedings tend to be summary in nature. For this reason the Legislature has afforded a person who is committed under such sections the right to demand a trial de nova by jury or judge on the issue as to whether or not he should be committed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 3050, 3051, 3108.) Any such hearings are required to be held in substantial compliance with the provisions of section 5125 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ’ ’

After he had been found an addict by the court, appellant requested a jury trial. Such a trial was had on May 5, 1965, and on May 6 the jury, on evidence that appellant was dependent on heroin, found him to be “ a narcotic drug addict or by reason of repeated use of narcotics is in imminent danger of becoming a narcotic drug addict. ’ ’

The evidence was conflicting but is unquestionably substantial enough to sustain a verdict of the jury.

Appellant urges, among other errors, that the jury was not properly instructed on the meaning of the terms “addiction” and “imminent danger of addiction” and that the failure of the court to give such instruction on its own motion, was prejudicial error. We agree.

[432]The only instruction on the subject of “addiction” and “imminent danger of addiction” was substantially as follows :