Casey v. City of Los Angeles
Before: Wood
WOOD, P. J. In these two consolidated actions the plaintiffs, who are widows of policemen or firemen, seek a declaration with respect to pension benefits under the provisions of the charter of respondent City of Los Angeles. On a prior appeal (Atwell v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal.App.2d 336 [20 Cal.Rptr. 462]—involving three actions, including the present two, Casey and Bowers), the judgments in the actions were affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions to the trial court to enter judgments in accordance with the opinion on appeal. Upon the retrial of the actions a question arose as to whether the court should receive evidence on the issue of estoppel—the issue that defendants were estopped to assert affirmative defenses to the effect that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and by provisions of the charter regarding the time within which to file claims. The trial court determined that “the law of the case” did not preclude the receiving of evidence on that issue. After receiving the evidence, the court found that defendants were estopped to assert said alleged defenses. Defendants appeal from the judgments.
Appellants (city and commissioners) contend that “the law of the ease” precluded the receiving of evidence on such issue of estoppel; and that the evidence received is insufficient to support the findings that defendants are estopped to assert said alleged defenses.
The plaintiffs are widows of firemen and policemen who had been pensioners under the charter provisions. In these actions, each plaintiff seeks a declaration that she is entitled to a fluctuating pension retroactive to the date of her husband’s death. The Bowers action was commenced more than three years after the death of the husband of each plaintiff in that action. The Casey action was commenced within three years after the death of the husband of each plaintiff in that action. In both actions, each plaintiff had filed a claim with the city more than six months after her husband’s death. (Three of them also filed claims “shortly” after the deaths.)
The prior appeal (Atwell v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 201 Cal.App.2d 336 [20 Cal.Rptr. 462]) was from judgments which were in favor of the plaintiffs in three consolidated [791]actions (Atwell,1 Casey, and Bowers). Those judgments were based, in substance, on determinations by the trial court, as follows: that a 1925 charter amendment was invalid insofar as it operated to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to fluctuating pensions; that the causes of action in Casey and Bowers were not barred by the provisions of sections 363 or 376 of the city charter, and the defendants were estopped to assert that the causes of action were barred by either of said charter sections; and that the causes of action in Bowers were not barred by the provisions of sections 312 or 338, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the defendants were estopped to assert that the causes of action are barred by either of said code sections.
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